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CLEANING THE MURKY SAFE HARBOR FOR FORWARD-LOOKING 
STATEMENTS: AN INQUIRY INTO WHETHER ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF 
FALSITY PRECLUDES THE MEANINGFUL CAUTIONARY STATEMENT DEFENSE  
by Allan Horwich 
Abstract 
 
Congress included a safe harbor for forward-looking statements in the 1995 Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act.  This affords certain issuers and other specified persons limited 
protection from civil liability for damages under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 when the projections or objectives in a forward-looking statement are not 
realized, i.e., turn out to be false.  The safe harbor contains two principal elements, in addition to 
protection for “immaterial” statements: one prong where projections are accompanied by 
“meaningful cautionary statements,” the second prong where the plaintiff fails to prove that the 
speaker made the statement with “actual knowledge” that it is false or misleading.  This article 
reviews the legislative history of the safe harbor, the divergent lines of case law interpreting it 
and extensive commentary on how the safe harbor should be applied.  The conclusion of this 
analysis is that the first prong is available as a complete defense without regard to the state of 
mind or intent of the speaker, so that (1) the second prong does not apply when the first prong is 
satisfied and (2) statements are not deemed not “meaningful” because a risk factor that rendered 
the forward-looking statement unlikely to be realized was knowingly omitted from the 
cautionary statements.  Although there may be policy reasons why the safe harbor should have 
been different, this interpretation is compelled by the language of the statute and the legislative 
history, including the “bespeaks caution” line of cases on which the statutory safe harbor was 
based, and judicial and scholarly analyses to the contrary are flawed. 
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CLEANING THE MURKY SAFE HARBOR FOR FORWARD-LOOKING 
STATEMENTS: AN INQUIRY INTO WHETHER ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF 
FALSITY PRECLUDES THE MEANINGFUL CAUTIONARY STATEMENT DEFENSE  
Allan Horwich* 
Many public companies disclose earnings projections and make other statements about 
their future.  Those companies are sometimes sued when the projection is not borne out.  This 
article addresses action by Congress to afford a safe harbor to public companies that make 
projections that are not accurate.  Based on an analysis of the statute, its legislative history, 
judicial decisions and commentary regarding the interaction of the multiple prongs of the safe 
harbor this article proposes a definitive resolution of the extent to which the prongs overlap – 
that the prongs are independent and in particular actual knowledge of the weaknesses in a 
projection, including lack of a good faith belief in the projection, is not relevant to reliance on 
the meaningful cautionary statement safe harbor. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) once frowned upon – indeed, 
“generally prohibited” – public company1 disclosure of earnings projections.2  The SEC 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law, and partner, Schiff Hardin 
LLP.  The author gratefully acknowledges the research and helpful comments of Allison Gott, 
J.D. 2010 (expected), Northwestern University School of Law.  The author also relied on the 
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1   In this article the phrase “public company” means an issuer that is subject to the public 
disclosure requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a) and 78o(d) (2000) [hereinafter “Exchange Act”]. 
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relented,3 and in some cases now mandates disclosure of information with a forward looking 
element.4  Making projections sometimes comes with a cost, however, as investors may seek 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release 
No. 5362, 38 FED. REG. 7220, 7220 (Mar. 19, 1973) (“It has been the Commission’s long-
standing policy generally not to permit projections to be included in prospectuses and reports 
filed with the Commission”); 2 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 77-79 (4th ed. 2007) (describing earlier SEC prohibition on the inclusion of 
projections in documents filed with the SEC and SEC position that projections were per se 
misleading). 
3 See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release 
No. 5362, 38 FED. REG. 7220, 7220 (Mar. 19, 1973); LOSS ET AL., supra note 2, at 80-95 
(recounting evolution of the change in SEC policy).  The current SEC policy is expressed in Item 
10(b) of SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (2009): 
 Commission Policy on Projections. The Commission encourages the use 
in [certain documents filed with the SEC] of management’s projections of future 
economic performance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an 
appropriate format.  The guidelines set forth [in subsections (1), (2) and (3)] 
represent the Commission’s views on important factors to be considered in 
formulating and disclosing such projections. 
(1) Basis for Projections. The Commission believes that 
management must have the option to present in Commission 
filings its good faith assessment of a registrant’s future 
performance.  Management, however, must have a reasonable 
basis for such an assessment. 
Subsections (2) and (3) of Item 10(b) provide guidance on preparing and presenting projections. 
 
4 For example, Item 7 of the annual report on Form 10-K required to be filed by public 
companies with the SEC requires that the company furnish the information required by Item 303 
of Regulation S-K. See Form 10-K, Part II, Item 7, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf.  Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations must disclose, among other forward-looking 
elements, “any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably 
expects will have a favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from 
continuing operations.” Regulation S-K, Item 303(a)(3)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2009). 
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damages when the projection does not come true, claiming that they were misled into buying or 
selling a security in reliance on an incorrect projection.5 
In a private damage action based on a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act6 
and SEC Rule 10b-5,7 the most common basis for a private damage claim under the federal 
securities laws,8 there is liability for an incorrect projection only if the defendant stated the 
projection with scienter, an intent to deceive.9  “Scienter” is generally understood to encompass 
reckless conduct, although the Supreme Court has not addressed that issue.10  If a materially 
incorrect projection is made in an effective registration statement for a public offering of 
                                                 
5 See 5C ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 
12.28 nn. 3-5 & 38 (2009) (collecting cases involving claims for misleading financial 
projections). For a discussion of Congressional concern about litigation based on incorrect 
projections, see infra text accompanying notes 21-23.  This article sometimes uses the phrase 
“incorrect projection” to refer to a projection that does not come true, irrespective of whether it 
was believed to be accurate or had a reasonable basis when made.  
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
8 DONNA M. NAGY, ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT CASES AND 
MATERIALS 19 (2d ed. 2008) (“Rule 10b-5 is the leading anti-fraud weapon in the federal 
securities laws.”). 
9 See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 768 (2008) 
(“In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or 
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or 
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or 
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”). “Scienter” is a “mental state embracing 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 
(1976). 
10 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, 551 U.S. 308, 381 n.3 (2007) (“Every 
Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter 
requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the Circuits 
differ on the degree of recklessness required.”). 
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securities, however, the issuer could be liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 193311 
irrespective of any culpability.12  Directors and officers of the issuer can defend a Section 11 
claim by showing that after reasonable investigation the person had reasonable ground to believe 
that the projection was sound.13 
In 1979 the SEC adopted two rules to provide safe harbors for certain forward-looking 
statements.14  Under these rules if certain criteria are satisfied the statements are deemed not 
“fraudulent” and thus not the subject of any claim for wrongful conduct.15  These rules proved to 
have limited utility in providing a defense, most notably because a court is able to determine that 
the criteria for protection are satisfied only after inquiring into the facts, including the good faith 
of the person who made the statement.  Adding these safe harbors to a public company’s arsenal 
of defense tools thus did little to remove the litigation exposure for making an incorrect 
projection even in the utmost good faith.16 
                                                 
11 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000) [hereinafter “Securities Act”]. 
12 See generally Allan Horwich, Section 11 of the Securities Act: The Cornerstone Needs 
Some Tuckpointing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1, 10, 18-24 (2002) (discussing strict liability of the issuer in 
an action under Section 11).  For a case where issuer liability under Section 11 was pursued 
based upon an alleged incorrect financial projection, see Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 
892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming judgment for defendants on ground that projections were 
not material). 
13 Section 11(b)(3)(A) and (C), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) and (C) (2000). 
14 A “safe harbor” is “[a] provision (as in a statute or regulation) that affords protection 
from liability or penalty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1453 (9th ed. 2009). 
15 Rule 175 under the Securities Act (17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2009)) and Rule 3b-6 under 
the Exchange Act (17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2009)) were adopted in Safe Harbor Rules for 
Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, 44 FED. REG. 38810 (July 2, 1979).  For a 
discussion of the background of these rules, see LOSS ET AL., supra note 2, at 81-94.   
16 See Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 7101, 59 
FED. REG. 52723, 52728 (Oct. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Concept Release] (“The safe harbor is 
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Courts adopted the bespeaks caution doctrine as a means of winnowing non-meritorious 
incorrect projection claims under the federal securities laws.  Under one line of bespeaks caution 
cases, a forward-looking statement that is sufficiently qualified by cautionary statements is not 
“material.”17  Because materiality is an essential element of a claim of deception under the 
federal securities laws, this doctrine afforded a defense to claims based on an incorrect 
projection.18  In appropriate cases the bespeaks doctrine is raised on a motion to dismiss the 
                                                                                                                                                             
infrequently raised by defendants, perhaps because it compels judicial examination of 
reasonableness and good faith, which preclude early, prediscovery dismissal. Thus, critics state 
that the safe harbor is ineffective in ensuring the quick and inexpensive dismissal of frivolous 
private lawsuits.”); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of 
the Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 104-2 
at 233, 235 (1995) (statement of Cohen, Rosenman & Colin) (“determining whether a statement 
was made in good faith [under Rule 175] usually requires extensive discovery and can become 
the focus of protracted litigation”).  Professor John Coffee described the existing SEC rule safe 
harbor as “very shallow” and “dysfunctional.” Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
103rd Cong. 112, 181 (1994). See also infra note 22. 
17 See 4 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 642-48 
(4th ed. 2009) (describing the bespeaks caution doctrine). See also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994) (discussing multiple lines of 
cases under variations of the bespeaks caution doctrine). 
18 As reflected supra note 9, a “material” misrepresentation or omission is one of the 
elements of a private damage cause of action under Rule 10b-5 for deception.  The same 
principle applies to actions under Section 11 of the Securities Act. Section 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 
77k(a) (2000) (imposing liability for an untrue statement of a material fact or omission to state a 
material fact required to be stated in the registration statement or necessary to make the 
statements made not misleading).  Information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable shareholder would consider the information important in making an investment 
decision. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (applying materiality test of TSC 
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating materiality test under the proxy 
rules), to claim under Rule 10b-5).  In other words, a fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the fact would be viewed by a reasonable investor as 
significantly altering the “total mix” of information. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (applying the 
concept to actions under Rule 10b-5).  Information need not be outcome determinative in the 
investor’s decision – it need only be considered important in the decision-making process. TSC 
Indus. Inc., 426 U.S. at 449. 
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complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19  In applying the bespeaks caution doctrine, courts may take 
into account an indisputably authentic disclosure document extant at the time of the alleged 
incorrect projection, whether or not the plaintiff included the cautionary disclosures in its 
complaint.20 
In 1995 Congress enacted extensive reforms to securities litigation in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”).21  Reflecting a judgment that neither the bespeaks 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 373 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(affirming grant of motion to dismiss based on bespeaks caution doctrine, finding that the 
warnings and cautionary language that accompanied the challenged projections “served to negate 
any potentially misleading effect” created by the projections in an offering prospectus, so that 
“no reasonable jury could conclude that the subject projections materially influenced a 
reasonable investor”). 
20 See, e.g., Trump, 7 F.3d at 368 n. 9; Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1122-
223 (10th Cir. 1997) (taking into account contemporaneous disclosures and discussing legal 
basis for doing so). 
21 Pub. Law No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  For a general discussion of the 
background of the PSLRA, see MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION AFTER THE REFORM 
ACT, § 1.01, at 1012-23 (2009).  
A major purpose of the PSLRA was to impose new or higher hurdles for plaintiffs to 
pursue private claims for damages under the Securities Act and Exchange Act, especially class 
actions.   The Conference Report for the PSLRA stated: 
 This Conference Report seeks to protect investors, issuers, and all who are 
associated with our capital markets from abusive securities litigation.  This 
legislation implements needed procedural protections to discourage frivolous 
litigation.  It protects outside directors, and others who may be sued for non-
knowing securities law violations, from liability for damage actually caused by 
others.  It reforms discovery rules to minimize costs incurred during the pendency 
of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.  It protects investors 
who join class actions against lawyer-driven lawsuits by giving control of the 
litigation to lead plaintiffs with substantial holdings of the securities of the issuer.  
It gives victims of abusive securities lawsuits the opportunity to recover their 
attorneys’ fees at the conclusion of all action.  And it establishes a safe harbor for 
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caution doctrine nor the SEC rule-based safe harbors afforded adequate protection for public 
companies that made forward-looking statements,22 in the PSLRA Congress added safe harbors 
                                                                                                                                                             
forward looking statements, to encourage issuers to disseminate relevant 
information to the market without fear of open-ended liability. 
H. R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (Nov. 28, 1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 
[hereinafter “Conference Report” or PSLRA Conf. Rep.]. 
 
22 The Conference Committee for the PSLRA stated: 
The concept of a safe harbor for forward-looking statements made under 
certain conditions is not new. In 1979, the SEC promulgated Rule 175 to provide 
a safe harbor for certain forward looking statements made with a “reasonable 
basis” and in “good faith.” This safe harbor has not provided companies 
meaningful protection from litigation. In a February 1995 letter to the SEC, a 
major pension fund stated: “A major failing of the existing safe harbor is that 
while it may provide theoretical protection to issuers from liability when 
disclosing projections, it fails to prevent the threat of frivolous lawsuits that arises 
every time a legitimate projection is not realized.” See February 14, 1995 letter 
from the California Public Employees’ Retirement System to the SEC.  
PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 43 n. 29, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 742 n. 29.  The Conference 
Committee also stated: 
 
Abusive litigation severely affects the willingness of corporate managers 
to disclose information to the marketplace. Former SEC Chairman Richard 
Breeden testified in a Senate Securities Subcommittee hearing on this subject: 
“Shareholders are also damaged due to the chilling effect of the current system on 
the robustness and candor of disclosure. . . . Understanding a company’s own 
assessment of its future potential would be among the most valuable information 
shareholders and potential investors could have about a firm.” 
Fear that inaccurate projections will trigger the filing of securities class 
action lawsuit has muzzled corporate management. One study found that over 
two-thirds of venture capital firms were reluctant to discuss their performance 
with analysts or the public because of the threat of litigation. Anecdotal evidence 
similarly indicates corporate counsel advise clients to say as little as possible, 
because “legions of lawyers scrub required filings to ensure that disclosures are as 
milquetoast as possible, so as to provide no grist for the litigation mill.” 
Id. at 42-43, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 741-42 (footnotes omitted). 
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for certain forward-looking statements to both the Securities Act (new Section 27A) and the 
Exchange Act (new Section 21E).23  One aspect of these safe harbors is the focus of this article. 
II. THE PSLRA STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR FOR FORWARD-LOOKING 
STATEMENTS 
What follows is an overview of the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements 
sufficient to provide a framework to address one aspect of the safe harbor that remains unsettled 
after fourteen years.  This article does not include a comprehensive discussion of all aspects of 
the safe harbor.24 
                                                 
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2 and 78u-5 (2000).  Because there are many more significant private 
suits for damages under the Exchange Act than under the Securities Act (see, e.g., CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 2008 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS at 10 (n.d.) 
(stating that “[o]nly a fraction” of the securities class actions settled in 1996 through 2008 did 
not involve a claim under Rule 10b-5), available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-
2008/Settlements_Through_12_2008.pdf), most of the discussion of the statutory safe-harbor for 
forward-looking statements in this article, and thus specific statutory citations, will address 
Section 21E. 
 24 For extensive discussions of all aspects of the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking 
statements, see the following materials, which were invaluable sources of case law citations 
drawn upon in preparing this article: Marc H. Folladori, Protecting Forward-Looking 
Statements: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Other Safeguards, 1710 
PLI/Corp 549 (Practising Law Institute Jan. 2009); Richard Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor 
for Forward-Looking Statements: A Scorecard in the Courts from November 2004 through 
November 2006, 39 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 54 (Jan. 15, 2007); Richard Rosen, The Safe 
Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements in the Courts, May 2003 through October 2004: Does 
Asher Change the Rules?, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2135 (Dec. 6, 2004); Richard Rosen, 
The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements: A Scorecard in the Courts from 
January 2002 through April 2003, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1000 (June 16, 2003); Richard 
Rosen, Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements in the Courts: A Year 2001 Scorecard, 34 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 91 (Jan. 21, 2002); Richard Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for 
Forward-Looking Statements in the Courts: A Year 2000 Scorecard, 1213 PLI/Corp 765  
(Practising Law Institute Nov. 2000). 
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The PSLRA safe harbor applies to certain statements made by public companies and 
specified other persons, such as a person acting on behalf of the company.25  The safe harbor 
does not apply to statements made by persons who are subject to specified disqualifications or to 
statements made in connection with certain transactions.26  The safe harbor defines the term 
“forward-looking statement,” with the result that the safe harbor does not apply to all statements 
by public companies that speak to the future but it surely covers the preponderance of the 
significant ones.27 
The provision that affords the safe harbors states as follows:28 
[I]n any private action arising under [the Exchange Act] that is based on an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary to make the 
statement not misleading, a person referred to in subsection (a) of this section 
shall not be liable with respect to any forward-looking statement, whether written 
or oral, if and to the extent that – 
(A) the forward-looking statement is – 
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements 
identifying important factors that could cause actual 
results to differ materially from those in the forward 
looking statement; or 
                                                 
25 Section 21E(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (2000). 
 
26 Section 21E(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b) (2000).  For example, the safe harbor is not 
available for forward-looking statements made in “in connection with a tender offer” or “in 
connection with an initial public offering.” Section 21E(b)(2)(C)-(D). See, e.g., In re Infonet 
Services Corp. Sec. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088-93, 1103-04  (C.D. Cal. 2003) (analyzing 
forward-looking statements in initial public offering prospectus under bespeaks caution and 
analyzing subsequent forward-looking statements under the statutory safe harbor). 
27 Section 21E(i)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (2000).  Covered statements include “a 
statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss), earnings 
(including earnings loss) . . . and other financial items.” Section 21E(i)(1)(A). 
28 Section 21E(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2000). 
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(ii) immaterial; or 
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement – 
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with 
actual knowledge by that person that the statement 
was false or misleading; or 
(ii) if made by a business entity, was – 
 (I) made by or with the approval of an 
 executive officer of that entity; and 
 (II) made or approved by such officer with 
 actual knowledge by that officer that the 
 statement was false or misleading. 
Before turning to an exegesis of this statutory language, several other aspects of the safe 
harbor should be noted.  On any motion to dismiss based on the safe harbor, “the court shall 
consider any statement cited in the complaint and any cautionary statement accompanying the 
forward-looking statement, which are not subject to material dispute, cited by the defendant.”29  
In other words, the defendant can move to dismiss based on cautionary statements in, most 
commonly, some document filed by the company with the SEC even if those statements are not 
contained in the complaint or even adverted to by the plaintiff.30  If the defendant moves for 
summary judgment based on the safe harbor, any discovery not “specifically directed to the 
application” of the safe harbor is stayed.31  The availability of the safe harbor does not in and of 
itself “impose upon any person a duty to update a forward-looking statement.”32 
                                                 
29 Section 21E(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(e) (2000). 
30  See, e.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278-80 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(holding error to refuse to consider, on motion to dismiss asserting protection of the statutory 
safe harbor, documents filed by the defendant with the SEC).   
31 Section 21E(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(f) (2000). 
32 Section 21E(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(d) (2000). 
 
 -11-  
Returning to the core provision, the gist of the safe harbor is that in any private action33 a 
person covered by the safe harbor is not liable for an incorrect projection if (I) the projection was 
identified as forward-looking and was accompanied by “meaningful cautionary statements 
identifying important factors that could cause actually results to differ materially from those” in 
the projection, (Ia) the projection was “immaterial,” or (II) the plaintiff fails to prove that the 
projection was made with actual knowledge of its falsity or misleading character.34  These few 
words raise myriad issues of interpretation. 
For example, on a first reading the inclusion of alternative Ia may seem to be superfluous, 
inasmuch as an “immaterial” statement, forward-looking or otherwise, could never provide the 
basis for a claim that is predicated upon an alleged violation of Rule 10b-5 for making “an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statement not misleading.”  Congress included this alternative to underscore that a forward-
looking statement might be immaterial for reasons other than its having been qualified by 
meaningful cautionary statements.35  One example is a forward-looking statement – entirely 
unqualified by cautions – that is immaterial because it is mere puffery.36   
                                                 
33 See Section 21E(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2000).  Thus, the statutory safe harbor 
does not apply in an enforcement action by the SEC or a criminal prosecution for securities fraud 
by the Department of Justice. NAGY, supra note 8, at 77-78. 
34 The statute also provides a subset of rules where the forward-looking statement is made 
orally, rather than in writing. Section 21E(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(2) (2000).  
35 The Conference Report states: 
Courts may continue to find a forward-looking statement immaterial – and 
thus not actionable under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act – on other grounds. To 
clarify this point, the Conference Committee includes language in the safe harbor 
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Other issues of interpretation include (1) when do meaningful cautionary statements  
“accompany” the forward-looking statement, (2) what is a “meaningful” cautionary statement, 
and (3) can a court determine whether the safe harbor has been satisfied merely by looking at 
                                                                                                                                                             
PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743.  If, as concluded in this 
article, the first prong is itself a test of materiality, one might expect the word “otherwise” to 
appear before “immaterial” in Section 21E(c)(1)(A)(ii).  Professor John Coffee has recounted the 
legislative history of the absence of the word “otherwise”: 
 
[I]f subclause (i) of subsection (c)(1)(A) is read to require that the “meaningful 
cautionary statements” render the false statement immaterial, arguably subclause 
(ii) sounds superfluous. A closer look at the drafting history, however, explains 
this puzzle. The October 26, 1995 draft conference report shows that subsection 
(c)(1)(A)(ii) originally said “otherwise immaterial,” implying in effect that a 
properly qualified forward-looking statement was also immaterial as a matter of 
law. In the November 9, 1995 draft and in the final conference report, the word 
“otherwise” was dropped, probably as a simplifying language change. Given this 
evolution of the language, subclause (i) appears to be saying that a forward-
looking statement that is properly qualified by “meaningful cautionary 
statements” becomes immaterial, but, even if not so qualified, it can be immaterial 
for other and independent reasons under subclause (ii). Indeed, the Statement of 
Managers virtually spells this out. 
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat 
Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 991 (1996) (footnote omitted).   The last reference to 
the Statement of Managers is to PSLRA Conf. Rep. at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743, quoted 
earlier in this footnote.  
 
36 See, e.g., Indiana State Dist. Council of Laborers and Hod Carriers Pension and 
Welfare Fund v. Omnicare, 583 F.3d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding immaterial puffing 
statements that “do nothing more than vaguely predict positive future results, a claim so banal 
and ubiquitous that it cannot engender reliance by reasonable investors”); Eisenstadt v. Centel 
Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (“[m]ere sales puffery is not actionable 
under Rule 10b-5”); Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993) (“‘Soft,’ 
‘puffing’ statements . . . generally lack materiality because the market price of a share is not 
inflated by vague statements predicting growth”).  This doctrine was well-established at the time 
the PSLRA was enacted. See Jennifer O’Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate 
Re-emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 
1697, 1709 n.50,  1711 n.77, 1712 n.84. and 1713-14 n.95 (1998) (collecting cases, both before 
and after the PSLRA, applying the puffery concept) and Langevoort, supra note 17. 
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those accompanying cautionary statements or must there be evidence relating to what were, at 
the time of the statements, objectively the (more) important contingencies.37 
The issues just identified, however, are not the focus here, with the exception of some 
discussion of the second of those points.38  This article addresses whether proof that the forward-
looking statement was made with actual knowledge of its falsity – element “II” in the third 
preceding paragraph (sometimes referred to here as the “second prong”) – can supersede, or at 
least must be taken into account in, the application of the meaningful cautionary language safe 
harbor – element “I” in the third preceding paragraph (sometimes referred to as the “first 
prong”).  In the statute the word “or” appears after “immaterial.”  One might thus quickly 
conclude that a person can escape liability under the safe harbor (“shall not be liable”) for the 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook. J.) 
(holding that on the pleadings, the court could not apply alternative I of the safe harbor because 
“there is no reason (on this record) to conclude that [the defendant] mentioned those sources of 
variance that (at the time of the projection) were the principal or important risks”).  Some 
commenters, including this author, have been critical of Asher for taking an approach that 
effectively precluded disposition of cases at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Alfred Wang, 
Comment, The Problem of Meaningful Language: Safe Harbor Protection in Securities Class 
Action Suits after Asher v. Baxter, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1907, 1928-32, 1936-37 (2006) (“Judge 
Easterbrook’s decision rejected the overwhelming goals that carried the PSLRA through its 
legislative battles until its enactment over the President’s veto. This decision is at odds with the 
Reform Act’s language, its legislative history, and with the precedents in the other circuits.”); 
Allan Horwich, Is There a Breach in The Breakwater of the Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-
Looking Statements?, 8 WALL ST. LAWYER, Sept. 2004, at 19, 22 (“the safe harbor will become a 
defense first usable at the summary judgment stage, after plaintiffs have had a full opportunity to 
rummage through defendants’ documents and take extensive depositions”)(footnote omitted).  
Others were, and remain, more sanguine. Richard Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for 
Forward-Looking Statements: A Scorecard in the Courts from November 2004 through 
November 2006, 39 SEC. REG.& L. REP. (BNA)  54 (Jan. 15, 2007) (“Fears of the safe harbor’s 
demise [because of Asher] have not been realized”); Joseph De Simone et al., Asher to Asher and 
Dust to Dust: The Demise of the PSLRA Safe Harbor?, 1 N.Y.U.J. LAW & BUS. 799, 837 (2005) 
(“Asher is best viewed as a significant development in the normal ebb and flow of a resilient and 
influential defense theory, which has flourished since its enactment as part of the PSLRA in 
1995”). 
38 See infra Parts IV.C and V.B. 
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incorrect projection if either the statement was accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
statements or, even if there were insufficient cautionary statements or the speaker failed to direct 
the audience to the cautionary statements, the plaintiff failed to prove (and thus failed to plead39) 
that the projection was made with actual knowledge of its falsity.  That is, a covered defendant 
may prevail under either scenario, so that the question of whether the statement was made with 
actual knowledge of its falsity is moot if the projection was accompanied by meaningful 
cautionary statements. Notwithstanding the arguable clarity of the language, the courts have not 
uniformly interpreted the safe harbor so that “or” means “or,” or they have adopted a 
construction of the first prong that is influenced by allegations of the elements of the second 
prong.  This article addresses which interpretation is correct. 
The answer to these questions is of considerable significance.  Congress (or at least many 
members of Congress) and the SEC have stated that dissemination of management’s own 
projections is a good thing.40  While it is unclear whether the enactment of the PSLRA safe 
                                                 
39 The second prong of the safe harbor speaks only in terms of the consequences of 
plaintiff’s failure to prove certain facts.  Presumably, in order to avoid dismissal of a claim based 
on an incorrect projection the plaintiff must also plead the defendant’s actual knowledge. Cf. 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (holding that because in a claim 
under Rule 10b-5 the PSLRA requires that the plaintiff prove the element of loss causation the 
plaintiff must also allege the requisite elements of loss causation). Cases addressing the second 
prong have uniformly so held at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Institutional Investors 
Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 259 (3d Cir. 2009) (ruling that second (actual knowledge) 
prong of the statutory safe harbor applies if the plaintiff fails to plead actual knowledge of the 
falsity of the statement); Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., 2005 WL 2319936, at *19  (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
21, 2005) (holding, and collecting cases so ruling, that second prong requires pleading of actual 
knowledge). 
40 See, e.g., Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act 
Release No. 5362, 38 Fed. Reg. 7220, 7220 (Mar. 19, 1973): 
[O]n the basis of the information obtained through the hearings and on the basis 
of staff recommendations and its experience in administering the securities laws, 
the Commission has now determined that changes in its present policies with 
 
 
 -15-  
harbor actually led to increased disclosure of financial projections by public companies,41 if  
protections thought to be afforded by the safe harbor have resulted in increased disclosure of 
forward-looking information, there could be retrenchment in the extent of disclosures if the safe 
harbor is interpreted more narrowly than public companies had anticipated.42 
                                                                                                                                                             
regard to use of projections would assist in the protection of investors and would 
be in the public interest. The Commission recognizes that projections are 
currently widespread in the securities markets and are relied upon in the 
investment process. Persons invest with the future in mind and the market value 
of a security reflects the judgments of investors about the future economic 
performance of the issuer. Thus projections are sought by all investors, whether 
institutional or individual. . . . 
 Information gathered at the hearings reinforced the Commission’s own 
observation that management’s assessment of a company’s future performance is 
information of significant importance to the investor, that such assessment should 
be able to be understood in light of the assumptions made, and that such 
information should be available, if at all, on an equitable basis to all investors. 
See also supra note 22 and infra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
 
41 David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 46 (1998) (reporting 
that data collected suggest no more than a modest increase in the disclosure of forward-looking 
information rather than the anticipated “significant post-Act increase in both the frequency of 
firms issuing forecasts and the mean number of forecasts issued”). The safe harbor does, 
however, appear to have reduced somewhat the amount of litigation based on allegedly faulty 
projections. Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter 
More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,  23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 
642 (2007): 
Although earnings warnings continue to be an important trigger of lawsuits in the 
post-PSLRA period, firms are significantly less likely to be sued for such 
disclosures. In addition, issuing a forecast of positive earnings news is no longer a 
significant determinant of lawsuit filings, although the decrease in litigation risk 
associated with these disclosures is insignificant. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the PSLRA’s safe harbor provides firms some protection from 
disclosure-related litigation . . . . 
42 Meaningful empirical evidence here may be hard to come by.  Factors other than the 
effectiveness or absence of a liability shield may affect the prevalence of projections.  For 
example, the 2008-2009 recession made foretelling a company’s financial future more 
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PSLRA SAFE HARBOR 
The preceding discussion at the very least suggests that the language of the PSLRA safe 
harbor is unambiguous – the defendant prevails if either prong is satisfied.  Nevertheless, before 
turning to an examination of the judicial interpretation of the safe harbor it is useful to try to 
ascertain what Congress intended by the specific statutory language. 
A. Criteria for Considering Legislative History 
When and whether it is appropriate to resort to legislative history is a matter of 
considerable debate, and for every maxim regarding reliance on legislative history there seems to 
be an equal and opposite principle.43  Truly, this is a field where “the devil can cite Scripture for 
his purpose.”44  One rule is that when a statute is unambiguous the court ought not to consider 
the legislative history.45  Yet there are exceptions even when the statutory language seems 
clear.46  Even if the statute is ambiguous, however, that is, if the words used do not appear to 
                                                                                                                                                             
precarious, with the result that some companies that had been making projections suspended the 
practice. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, Retailers Get Stingy with Data, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 17, 2008, 
at C1 (reporting that J. C. Penney and Starbucks, among other companies, had ceased disclosing 
annual profit estimates). 
43 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of 
Cannons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (citing 
28 pairs of opposing canons of statutory construction). 
44 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3.   
45 United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (holding that when the language of a 
statute is plain, legislative history is irrelevant); Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253-254 (1992) (“courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this 
first canon is also the last: the judicial inquiry is complete”) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
46 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989): 
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have an unmistakable meaning, there is some dispute about the propriety of resorting to 
legislative history to resolve the uncertainty.47 
In most situations where resort to legislative history is appropriate, the primary source is 
the Conference Committee report.48  Here that is particularly apt, because the final safe harbor 
provisions differed from both the House and Senate bills that went to conference.49 
                                                                                                                                                             
Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it 
apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems inconsistent with 
Congress’ intention, since the plain-meaning rule is “rather an axiom of 
experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive 
evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 
(1928) (Holmes, J.). See also United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 
310 U.S. 534, 543-544 (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as 
used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which 
forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial 
examination’”) (citations omitted). 
See also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S, 453, 458 
(1974) (“even the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear 
contrary evidence of legislative intent”).  
47 Compare Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (“Where . . . the resolution of a 
question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the 
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear”) with 
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-10 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“the only 
language that constitutes ‘a Law’ within the meaning of the Bicameralism and Presentment 
Clause of article I, § 7, and hence the only language adopted in a fashion that entitles it to our 
attention, is the text of the enacted statute”), and United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 
504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[legislative history is] that last hope of lost 
interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction”).  An explanation of 
how Justice Scalia interprets statutes is beyond the scope of this article.  For one analysis of his 
approach to statutory interpretation, see 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J. D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65A:10 (7th ed. 2008). 
48 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J. D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 48.8, at 580-81 (7th ed. 2007) (“Since the conference report represents the final 
statement of terms agreed to by both houses of Congress, next to the statute itself, it is the most 
persuasive evidence of congressional intent”) (footnote omitted). 
49 PSLRA Conf. Report, supra note 21, at 43, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 742. See also infra  
text accompanying notes 62-103. 
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The following discussion also presents material from the floor debates as each house 
adopted a bill, the conference report was debated, the President vetoed the bill and his veto was 
overridden.  It is doubtful that one should rely on statements of a single legislator, or even a 
group of them, who support a bill.50  It is even more suspect to interpret statutory language based 
on the meaning given to the words by those who opposed it.51  Nevertheless, because there was 
extensive floor debate on the safe harbor, in the interest of shedding as much light as possible 
from the legislative process, this article includes a narrative of each phase of that process. 
B. The PSLRA Conference Report 
The two major prongs of the safe harbor are described as such in the Conference 
Report.52  “The first prong of the safe harbor requires courts to examine only the cautionary 
statement accompanying the forward-looking statement.  Courts should not examine the state of 
mind of the person making the statement.”53  Because state of mind (“actual knowledge”) is the 
                                                 
50 See SINGER ET AL., supra note 48,  at 600-607. 
51 See, e.g., Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483 (1981) (“[t]he fears 
and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation,” 
quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1951)). 
52 PSLRA Conf. Report, supra note 21 at 43-44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 742-43. 
53 Id. at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743.  One court ruled, based on its analysis of the 
quoted text, that the preclusion of the examination of the speaker’s state of mind referred to is the 
state of mind when making the cautionary statement, not when making the forward-looking 
statement. Desai v. General Growth Properties, 654 F. Supp. 2d 836, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  While 
this grammatical construction is not implausible, it is not the only reasonable construction of the 
sentence, and numerous courts have understood the state of mind reference in the Conference 
Report to apply to the forward-looking statement itself. See, e.g., Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 
799, 803 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Humana, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2009 WL 1767193, at *15 (W.D. Ky. 
June 15, 2009); Yellen v. Hake, 437 F. Supp. 2d 941, 962 (S.D. Iowa July 7, 2006); In re Gilat 
Satellite Networks Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2277476, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2005) 
(including extensive discussion of the legislative history); In re BMC Software, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
183 F. Supp. 2d 860, 881 n.28 (S.D. Tex. 2001); In re Splash Technology Holdings, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 2000 WL 1727377, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000).  Nor is it apparent why the authors of 
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essence of the second prong, this statement strongly suggests that the first prong provides an 
independent ground of exoneration.  According to the Conference Report, “Instead of examining 
the forward-looking and cautionary statements” the second prong requires a “focus[] on the state 
of mind of the person making the forward-looking statement,”54 thus reinforcing the 
independence of the two prongs.  The second prong is described as an “alternative,”55 which, 
given the overall structure of the safe harbor – the first prong applies where the defendant 
satisfies the specified elements, the second prong applies if the plaintiff fails to make the 
requisite showing of knowledge – supports a conclusion that applicability of the first prong puts 
an end to the claim.  Finally, the Conference Report states: 
The applicability of the safe harbor provisions under subsection (c)(1)(B) shall be 
based on the “actual knowledge” of the defendant and does not depend on the use 
of cautionary language. The applicability of the safe harbor provisions under 
subsections (c)(1)(A)(I) and (c)(2) shall be based upon the sufficiency of the 
cautionary language under those provisions and does not depend on the state of 
mind of the defendant.56 
Taken as a whole these remarks reflect Congressional intent that the two prongs are 
independent and either one, if satisfied, protects the covered speaker.  Notwithstanding these 
seemingly clear statements in the primary source of legislative history, a deeper consideration of 
the legislative history may help to illuminate the meaning of the two prongs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Conference Report would have focused on the good faith of the cautionary statements 
standing alone as distinguished from the forward-looking statements, on which the claim of 
liability is based.  In the end, the Desai court determined that the plain language of the statute 
compels the conclusion that the defendant’s state of mind is irrelevant under the first prong.  654 
F. Supp. 2d at 843-44.  
 
54 PSLRA Conf. Report, supra note 21, at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 47, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 746 (emphasis added). 
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C. Legislative History of the PSLRA Prior to the Conference Report 
Reform of securities litigation had been under consideration for several years before 
debate on the PSLRA.57  By the time that proposed legislation came before the 104th Congress, 
there appears to have been widespread agreement that some improvement in the SEC safe harbor 
rules for forward-looking statements58 was needed because of the effect the threat of litigation 
had on corporate willingness to make earnings projections and other forward-looking statements 
coupled with the recognition that disclosures of that type were desired by and valuable to 
investors.59  A Congressional staff report had noted that statements that litigation may discourage 
disclosure 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., Private Litigation under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 
(1993); and Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. 
(1994). 
58 See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
59 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 7125 (Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (“The threat of 
lawsuits over so-called forward-looking information . . . is so serious that many if not most 
CEO’s these days refuse to talk to the press at all about their company’s performance and yet 
that is exactly the kind of information the market needs to operate.”); and id. at 16936 (June 22, 
1995) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (“Abusive litigation also severely impacts the willingness of 
corporate managers to disclose information to the marketplace. . . . Understanding a company’s 
own assessment of its future potential would be amongst the most valuable information 
shareholders and potential investors could have.”).  See also Concept Release, supra note 16, at 
52728: 
[C]ritics [of the SEC safe harbor rules] argue that, unless the courts vigorously 
apply a higher pleading threshold sufficient to sustain a motion to dismiss based 
on the allegations of a class-action complaint, the mere threat of litigation will 
continue both to discourage management from making forward-looking disclosure 
and cause those companies that nonetheless provide such disclosure to incur 
significant costs in defense of nonmeritorious litigation. 
To be sure, there were contrary views.  In hearings before a Senate subcommittee in 
1993, Professor Joel Seligman expressed doubt that corporate behavior in making, or not 
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suggests [sic] that securities litigation may be working at cross-purposes to the 
fundamental objectives of the securities laws.  The countervailing argument is 
also compelling that potential securities litigation has on balance reinforced the 
disclosure system, which in turn helped American securities markets to become 
the largest and most open in the world.60 
The report concluded that there is no “clear answer” to “[w]hether private securities litigation has 
a net positive or negative effect on corporate disclosure.”61 
Each of the principal bills that evolved into the PSLRA addressed a safe harbor for 
forward-looking statements.  The initial Senate bill simply proposed directing the SEC to adopt 
or amend rules providing a safe harbor, with Congress specifying factors that the SEC should 
consider in doing so.62  The House bill included a specific safe harbor.63 
                                                                                                                                                             
making, projections would be significantly influenced by changes in the law. Private Litigation 
under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 63 (1993).  Members of the plaintiffs’ 
securities litigation bar also expressed doubt that litigation had a “chilling effect” on disclosures. 
Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities on 
Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 48 (1995) 
(statement of William Lerach on behalf of National Association of Securities and Commercial 
Law Lawyers); and Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. 276 
(1994) (statement of Leonard B. Simon, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach) 
60 STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND 
URBAN AFFAIRS REPORT ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION, ABANDONMENT OF THE PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION FOR AIDING AND ABETTING SECURITIES FRAUD at  (1994), as reprinted in 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 103rd Cong. (1994) 166, at 215. 
61 Id. 
62 S. 240, 104th Cong. § 201 (as introduced January 18, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. 
REC.  1531 (Jan. 18, 1995). 
63 H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., § 5 (as introduced March 6, 1995). 
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Debate occurred first in the House, where the bill was considered by the House in the 
Committee of the Whole.64  The bill was amended on the floor to change the terms of the 
proposed safe harbor. The amendment provided that a person would not be liable with respect to 
any forward-looking statement in a private action under the Exchange Act “if and to the extent 
that” the statement was forward-looking and “refers clearly (or is understood by the recipient to 
refer) to” the forward-looking statement and “the risk that such projections, estimates or 
descriptions [of future events] may not be realized.” 65  As so amended the bill passed.66 
Debate on the safe harbor in the Senate was vigorous.  When S. 240 emerged from the 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, it had changed from a directive that the SEC 
take action into a substantive safe harbor.67  The safe harbor would not apply if the forward-
looking statement was “knowingly made with the expectation, purpose, and actual intent of 
misleading investors.”68  This was challenged on the ground that, “The safe harbor will for the 
first time protect fraudulent statements within the Federal securities laws” because of the high 
                                                 
64 141 CONG. REC. 7122 (Mar. 7, 1995). 
65 114 CONG. REC. 7267-68 (text of amendment), 7274 (passage of amendment) (Mar. 8, 
1995). 
66 H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., § 5 (as passed by the House, Mar. 8, 1995). 
67 S. 240 § 105, as reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. 16929, at 16932-33 (June 22, 1995).  See 
also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 40-42 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 718-21 
(Additional Views of Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer) (recounting changes to the safe 
harbor provisions of S. 240 as it had been introduced). 
68 S. 240 § 105, which would have added a new Section 13A(c)(1) to the Securities Act 
and a new Section 37(c)(1) to the Exchange Act, as reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. 16932-33 (June 
22, 1995).  “‘Expectation,’ ‘purpose,’ and ‘actual intent’ are independent elements of the 
exclusion, and plaintiffs have the burden of pleading and proving each of these elements.” S. 
REP. No. 104-98, at 18 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 697. 
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threshold of having to prove specific intent to invoke the exclusion.69  The sponsors of the bill 
then proposed an amendment that removed the word “expectation” from the safe harbor.70  This 
was adopted without opposition.71 
The Senate proponents of the safe harbor as thus modified rejected an argument to 
narrow the safe harbor by eliminating the requirement that the plaintiff prove intent, explaining 
that using a standard of mere knowledge of falsity could deprive a company of the safe harbor 
where the speaker is aware of a view held somewhere within the company that is contrary to that 
reflected in the forward-looking statement.72   
Opponents of the safe harbor mounted an aggressive challenge, contending that even as 
amended the safe harbor was too easily satisfied.73  The opponents first sought to restore the 
original language of S. 240, which would have directed the SEC to take action.74  The 
proponents of the safe harbor countered by expressing their frustration that the SEC had failed to 
                                                 
69 141 CONG. REC. 16944-45 (June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes); see also 
Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, to Senator D’Amato (May 25, 1995), as reprinted in 
141 CONG. REC. 16949 (June 22, 1995) (“I continue to have serious concerns about the safe 
harbor fraud exclusion as it relates to the stringent standard of proof that must be satisfied before 
a private plaintiff can prevail. . . .  The scienter standard in [S. 240 as reported out of committee] 
may be so high as to preclude all but the most obvious fraud.”). 
70 141 CONG. REC. 17231 (June 27, 1995) (amendment proposed by Sen. D’Amato). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 17236 (June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett). 
73 Id. at 17231-45, 17248-56 and 17258-60 (June 27, 1995). 
74 Id. at 17231-32 (June 27, 1995) (amendment proposed by Sen. Sarbanes).  The final 
legislation expressly provided that the SEC could grant additional safe harbors for forward-
looking statements. See, e.g., Section 21E(g) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(g) (2000). 
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propose a new regulatory safe harbor75 even though the SEC had issued a release in October 
1994 with a view toward doing so.76  The amendment was defeated 56 to 43.77 
The opponents of the safe harbor in S. 240, led by Senator Sarbanes, then advocated an 
amendment that would eliminate the protection of the safe harbor if the speaker had “actual 
knowledge that [the forward-looking statement] was false or misleading.”78  This failed when 
that motion to amend was tabled by a vote of 50 to 48.79  The full bill passed the Senate 70 to 
2980 with an exclusion from the safe harbor when the forward-looking statement was “knowingly 
made with the purpose and actual intent of misleading investors.”81 
D. Legislative History of the PSLRA After the Conference Report 
                                                 
75 Id. at 17238, 17244 (June 27, 1995) (statements of Sen. Dodd), 17243 (June 27, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Domenici).  
76 Concept Release, supra note 16.  In the Concept Release, the SEC recounted the 
development of the SEC safe harbor rules for forward-looking statements, identified the 
perceived benefits of forward-looking disclosures and the perceived failures of the existing safe 
harbor rules, discussed judicial approaches toward liability for forward-looking statements, 
identified several proposals for regulatory revisions to the safe harbors, solicited public comment 
on nine general topics and many subsidiary questions and scheduled public hearings.  
77 141 CONG. REC. 17245 (June 27, 1995). 
78 Id. at 17250 (June 27, 1995). 
79 Id. at 17259-60 (June 27, 1995).  Those who opposed the amendment wanted to 
preserve the standard of intent to deceive, requiring more proof than actual knowledge of falsity. 
See, e.g., id. at 17249-50 (statement of Sen. D’Amato).  As explained by Senator Brown, “Well, 
‘knowingly made’ and ‘actual knowledge’ sound similar and have some similarities.  I believe, 
in reading the legislation, the big difference is this: It is in the words of ‘purpose’ and “actual 
intent.’” Id. at 17258. 
80 Id. at 17443-44 (June 28, 1995). 
81 S. 240 § 105 (as passed by the Senate June 28, 1995), as reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. 
17444, at 17447-48 (June 28, 1995). 
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The bills of the House and Senate then went to conference, with the final form of the safe 
harbor emerging as described earlier.82  There was considerable debate on the Conference 
Report, as those who were concerned about the safe harbor before it went to conference reflected 
outrage at the safe harbor reported by the Conference Committee.  Much of the colloquy focused 
on whether the inclusion of cautionary statements would immunize from liability a person who 
made the forward-looking statement with knowledge of its falsity.  These statements may shed 
some light on whether the two prongs operate independently, whether satisfaction of the first 
prong renders the issue of actual knowledge vel non irrelevant.  Many statements made on the 
floor, principally from opponents of the safe harbor in the Conference Report who were 
concerned that the safe harbor immunized knowingly false statements, reflect that understanding.  
For example, Senator Sarbanes, the leading spokesperson for the group opposing the earlier form 
of the safe harbor that worked its way through the Senate, stated: 
I remain concerned that the safe harbor provision before us today will, for the first 
time, provide protection for fraudulent statements under the Federal securities 
laws.  For the first time, fraudulent statements will receive protection under the 
Federal securities laws. 
 The American Bar Association wrote the President last week that the safe 
harbor “has been transformed not simply into a shelter for the reckless, but for the 
intentional wrongdoer as well.”  Projections by corporate insiders will be 
protected no matter how unreasonable, no matter how misleading, no matter how 
fraudulent, if accompanied by boilerplate, cautionary language. 
 . . . . 
 
 [F]raud artists will be able to shield themselves from liability simply by 
accompanying their fraudulent statements with general cautions that actual results 
may differ.83 
 
                                                 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 24-37. 
83 141 CONG. REC. 35243 (Dec. 5, 1995) 
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Senator Bryan stated, “[E]ven statements that are false, totally false – we are not talking about 
misleading or inaccurate; we are talking about totally false statements – are protected.  That is, 
those who offer those statements now enjoy no liability if they simply add cautionary 
language.”84 
At other times, principally in statements from supporters of the bill, there are denials that 
the safe harbor would permit knowingly false statements, arguably implying that the second 
prong could supersede the first.  For example, Senator D’Amato stated, “The safe harbor does 
not give a license to lie.  The second prong does not give safe harbor protection when forward-
looking statements are made with actual knowledge that the statement is false or misleading.”85  
Senator Bennett added, “The comment was made that the safe harbor will now allow people to 
lie.  No, it will not.”86  Senator Dodd, a leader of the forces in favor of the safe harbor, stated that 
the safe harbor has two parts to it. 
The first is that any forward-looking statement may be accompanied by 
“meaningful cautionary statements that identify important factors that could 
cause” the prediction not to come true, or if a company officer fails to meet that 
test, all that a plaintiff must do is prove that the person actually knew that the 
statement was false or misleading.87 
                                                 
84 Id. at 35256.  Among other speakers, Senator Spector stated that “there is no liability 
for forward-looking statements with cautionary statements no matter what the intent.” Id. at 
35267.  Senator Feingold added, “The language of this bill protects forward-looking statements 
by insulating the maker of those statements from liability even if they are deliberately false, 
provided the statement is accompanied by what is termed ‘cautionary’ language.” Id. at 35267.  
Senator Biden stated that “deliberately fraudulent statements, written or oral, as long as they are 
accompanied by cautionary language, will be immunized from private liability.” Id. at 35299. 
Senator Cohen added, “The immunity is absolute, so long as the predictions are accompanied 
with cautionary language.” Id. at 35300. 
85  Id. at 35239. 
86 Id. at 35257. 
87 Id. at 35264 (emphasis added). 
 
 -27-  
Senator Dodd continued, however, “[I]t is hard for this Member to envision how anyone could 
lie in their predictive statements and still be covered by this safe harbor . . . .”88  Senator 
Moseley-Braun, a supporter of the legislation, offered this summary: 
 The conference report essentially codified the bespeaks caution doctrine.  
Moreover, in response to concerns raised by the distinguished ranking Democratic 
member of the Banking Committee, Senator Sarbanes, the conference report does 
not provide protection for statements not covered under the bespeaks caution 
provisions made with actual knowledge that they are false.89 
The pattern was much the same in the floor debate on the conference report in the House: 
opponents of the safe harbor expressed concern that cautionary statements would render intent 
irrelevant, proponents not so clearly accepting that interpretation.  Representative Markey, an 
opponent, stated that forward-looking statements “may be entirely immunized from liability as 
long as they are accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.”90 Senator Eschoo, a 
proponent, responded that the conference report protects the “rights of investors to sue in cases 
of actual fraud.”91  He then added, however, that there is no liability for forward-looking 
statements “as long as those statements are accompanied by specific warnings that their 
predictions may not come true.”92 
                                                 
88 Id.   
 
89 Id. at 35292 (emphasis added). 
90 Id. at 35566 (Dec. 6, 1995).  To the same effect, Representative Dingell characterized 
the conference report safe harbor as “immuniz[ing] deliberate fraud.” Id. at 35556.  
Representative Conyers called the safe harbor a “license to lie.” Id. at 35564. 
91 Id. at 35567. 
92 Id. 
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In the end, both houses passed the legislation.93 
E. The President’s Veto and the Override 
President Clinton vetoed the bill.94  He objected to the safe harbor, among other 
provisions: 
[W]hile I support the language in the Conference Report providing a “safe 
harbor” for companies that include meaningful cautionary statements in their 
projections of earnings, the Statement of Managers – which will be used by courts 
as a guide to the intent of the Congress with regard to the meaning of the bill – 
attempts to weaken the cautionary language that the bill itself requires.  Once 
again, the end result may be that investors find that their legitimate claims are 
unfairly dismissed.95 
Debate regarding overriding the veto quickly ensued. 
In the House the safe harbor was again contested, with opponents reflecting their 
interpretation that the second prong comes into play only if the first prong is not dispositive.  
Representative Markey claimed that the safe harbor “would give blanket immunity to those who 
would commit intentional fraud. . . . The state of mind of the company’s executives, meaning 
whether or not they intended to deceive or to mislead investors, is supposed to be irrelevant, even 
if the executive of the company, of the financial firm, intentionally lies to the investing public.”96  
Representative Collins stated, in extended remarks, “[A]ny statements made by a defendant in a 
                                                 
93 In the Senate the vote on the conference report was 65 to 30. Id. at 35304 (Dec. 5, 
1995).  In the House the vote was 320 to 102. Id. at 35571 (Dec. 6, 1995). 
94 Id. at 37797-98 (Dec. 20, 1995). 
95 Id. at 37798.  The reference to language in the Conference Report appears to be that 
which reflects that the first prong of the safe harbor controls if it has been satisfied. See supra 
text accompanying notes 52-55. See 141 CONG. REC. 37799 (Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Markey elucidating the basis for the veto). 
 
96 141 CONG. REC.  37799 (Dec. 20, 1995). This statement was relied on in Gilat, 2005 
WL 2277476, at *12 n.9, in finding that the defendant’s state of mind is irrelevant to the 
application of the first prong of the safe harbor. 
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securities fraud case would be exempt from liability – even if the statement is deliberately false – 
as long as it is accompanied by vaguely defined ‘cautionary’ language.”97  The veto was 
overridden by a vote of 319 to 100,98 satisfying the Constitutional requirement of a two-thirds 
vote of each house.99 
In the Senate Senator Sarbanes again led the attack. “Projections by corporate insiders 
will be protected, even though they may be unreasonable, misleading, and fraudulent, if 
accompanied by boilerplate cautionary language.”100  Senator Boxer, another opponent, added, 
“Fraudulent future predictions and estimates would be permitted under the bill if those 
defrauding attach ‘some’ possible reasons why the prediction might not come true.  Those 
defrauding can hide the real reason that their fraudulent prediction will not come true and they 
cannot be sued.”101 An exchange between Senator Feinstein and Senator Dodd, a principal 
sponsor of the PSLRA, included the following colloquy: 
Mrs. Feinstein: Or, as a separate test [from the first prong], as I am led to believe, 
the safe harbor does not apply if the statement is made with “actual knowledge” 
that the statement was “an untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a 
material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading.” 
                                                 
97 Id. at 37804. 
98 Id. at 37807. 
99 U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 7. 
100 141 CONG. REC.  38198 (Dec. 21, 1995).  Senator Sarbanes was supported in his 
concern by Professor John Coffee, who wrote the President a letter asserting that the conference 
report safe harbor was “a license to lie” and that “even if [a] knowingly false statement is made, 
the defendant escapes liability if ‘meaningful cautionary statement[s]’ are added to the forward-
looking statement.” Id. at 38201. 
101 Id. at 38211 (Dec. 21, 1995). 
 
 -30-  
Mr. Dodd: Mr. President, the Senator from California is correct as well on that.102 
The Senate then also overrode the veto, 68 to 30.103  Accordingly, the PSLRA became law with 
the version of the safe harbor included in the Conference Report. 
F. Conclusion – The Reliance by Congress on Bespeaks Caution in Fashioning 
the First Prong of the Statutory Safe Harbor 
It is generally understood that the statutory safe harbor was derived from the bespeaks 
caution doctrine.  The Conference Report reflects that bespeaks caution was a model for, but did 
not necessarily set the outer limits of, the first prong, as it described the safe harbor as “based on 
aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the judicially created ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine.”104  The version 
of the doctrine applied in Trump was used as a model by Congress.105  This is most clearly 
established by the fact that the actual words used in the first prong of the statutory safe harbor – 
“meaningful cautionary statements” – were used in Trump in articulating the bespeaks caution 
doctrine.106   
                                                 
102 Id. at 38222.  This exchange was relied upon in one case in support of the conclusion 
that state of mind is irrelevant to the first prong of the safe harbor. Gilat, 2005 WL 2277476, at 
*12 n.9. 
103 Id. at 38354 (Dec. 22, 1995). 
104 PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 43, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 742.  See also supra 
text accompanying note 89 (statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun).  
105 In addition to the analysis in the text that follows, see Jennifer O’Hare, Good Faith 
and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It’s Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 619, 641 
(1997) (reading Conference Report to “impl[y] that the statutory safe harbor was based on a 
materiality analysis,” with earlier legislative action even more clear in that respect, with specific 
reference to Trump); Beck, The Substantive Limits of Liability for Inaccurate Predictions, 44 
AM. BUS. L. J. 161, 195-96 (2007) (acknowledging that in formulating the safe harbor Congress 
was guided in large measure by the Trump materiality line of bespeaks caution cases). 
106 7 F.3d at 371.  Other bespeaks caution cases decided before enactment of the PSLRA 
used that phrase. See, e.g., Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Associates, Ltd., 45 F.3d 399, 399 
(11th Cir. 1995) (citing Trump); In re Quarterdeck Office Systems, Inc., Sec. Litig., 854 F. Supp. 
 
 
 -31-  
Bespeaks caution, like much of the jurisprudence in the development of the implied 
private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, was judge-made law akin to common law in that the 
courts have had to fill in the gaps to an unusual extent where the legislature or, in the case of 
Rule 10b-5 the regulator (the SEC), was silent.107  The leading securities law treatise describes 
the process as follows:108 
 [The law under Rule 10b-5], of course, is federal law: the “federal 
common law” of which Judge Friendly and others have spoken as forming a 
penumbra around every federal statute.  In theory the courts are merely construing 
a statute and a rule.  But when the statute and rule are, like § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, virtually as vague as the Due Process Clause, the law is surely as much judge 
made as in the classic common law of the states. 
This strongly suggests a parallel to when a statute uses terms with a settled meaning at 
common law.  When a statute uses a term that was applied at common law, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary the statute is to be interpreted using the common law meaning of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1466, 1471 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting Trump).  The bespeaks caution doctrine has been applied 
after the PSLRA using the same formulation. See, e.g., Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 
539, 548 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Trump). 
107 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975): 
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak 
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such growth may be 
quite consistent with the congressional enactment and with the role of the federal 
judiciary in interpreting it [citation omitted], but it would be disingenuous to 
suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5. It is 
therefore proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already discussed, 
what may be described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the 
portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor 
the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance. 
108 7 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 3479-80 
(3d ed. rev. 2003) (footnote omitted).   
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term.109  Indeed, some courts have referred to bespeaks caution as a common law doctrine.110  
Thus, the phrase “meaningful cautionary statements” should be interpreted in the statute as it was 
in the case – Trump – from which it was undeniably drawn.   
From this reliance on the express language in Trump it is reasonable to infer that the other 
elements of Trump were imported into the statutory safe harbor, most notably that the speaker’s 
state of mind is not relevant in assessing whether the first prong has been satisfied.111  To be 
                                                 
109 See Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1999) (“Congress intends to incorporate the 
well-settled meaning of the common–law terms it uses” unless the “statute otherwise dictates”); 
Gilbert v. U.S., 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962) (“in the absence of anything to the contrary it is fair to 
assume that Congress used that word in the statute in its common-law sense”). 
110 See, e.g., Western Washington Laborers Employers Pension Trust v. Panera Bread 
Co., 2009 WL 3756619, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2009); In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. 
Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 187 (D.D.C. 2007); and In re Nokia Oyj (Nokia Corp.) Sec. Litig., 
423 F. Supp. 2d 364, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
111 7 F.3d at 368  (applying bespeaks caution doctrine to dismiss claim even though 
plaintiffs alleged that defendants “had neither an honest nor a reasonable belief” in the 
challenged forward-looking statement).  
Professor Langevoort, writing on the bespeaks caution doctrine in the year before the 
PSLRA was adopted, observed that under Trump “even deliberate misrepresentation by the 
promoters apparently will be insulated from liability. This is important, for if a plaintiff can 
defeat a motion by charging deceptive intent or gross unreasonableness, much of the 
prophylactic power of the bespeaks caution doctrine is lost.” Langevoort, supra note 18, 49 BUS. 
LAW. at 488 (footnote omitted).  Professor Langevoort also observed: 
While it is impossible to completely reconcile the desire to eliminate 
misleading disclosures with the desire to control weak claims as a matter of law, 
the goals are not always mutually exclusive. A balanced approach is to hold that a 
case properly may be dismissed as a matter of law if the cautionary language or 
other disclosures make it highly unlikely that a typical investor would be misled 
even if the makers had no genuine, good faith belief in the reasonableness of the 
projection. Such reasoning applies in cases like Trump, where the risk disclosure 
was so specific and detailed that whatever small measure of optimism otherwise 
might be present was diluted effectively by the cautionary language.  
Id. at 500.  While Professor Langevoort does not dismiss entirely the relevance of the speaker’s 
state of mind when the bespeaks caution doctrine is applied (see, e.g., id. (“it well might make 
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sure, the bespeaks caution cases were not consistent on the relevance of the defendant’s state of 
mind,112 but the statements in the Conference Report on the irrelevance of state of mind under 
the first prong are in accord with Trump on this point.113  Scholarly criticisms of this conclusion 
are addressed later in this article.114 
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAFE HARBOR 
Judicial interpretations of the statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements vary 
widely.  Some cases treat the second (actual knowledge) prong as irrelevant if the first prong is 
satisfied.  A contrary line of cases treats the second prong as pertinent even if the first prong has 
been – or may be – satisfied, that is, an allegation of actual knowledge precludes dismissal even 
if there were meaningful cautionary statements. There is yet a third perspective, that if actual 
                                                                                                                                                             
sense to hold that forecasts and projections (forms of opinion, plainly) are actionable in private 
actions only if they are objectively unreasonable and not genuinely believed by the maker (unless 
something in the way they are disclosed is specifically misleading)” (footnote omitted)), the 
thrust of his analysis of the bespeaks caution doctrine was that the speaker’s state of mind was 
not relevant. 
 
112 In addition to Trump, compare Moorehead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 949 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying bespeaks caution doctrine where there were 
“risk statements, detailed cautionary language and disclosures about the underlying economic 
assumptions” even though “plaintiff alleged defendant recklessly prepared the feasibility study” 
and that “defendant made misrepresentations, omitted material facts and made economic 
predictions with reckless disregard for their validity”), with Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 
171 (5th Cir. 1994) (“the inclusion of general cautionary language regarding a prediction would 
not excuse the alleged failure to reveal known material, adverse facts”), and In re Worlds of 
Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 858 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“the bespeaks caution doctrine does 
not apply to immunize false statements if the defendants knew the statements were false when 
made”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 35 F.3d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we adopt the district 
court’s formulation of the [bespeaks caution] doctrine”). See also infra text accompanying note 
152 (summarizing commentary that bespeaks caution doctrine ignores whether the speaker acted 
in good faith) 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 53-56. 
114 See infra text accompanying notes 160-178. 
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knowledge of falsity is alleged the cautionary statements cannot be “meaningful” so that the first 
prong cannot be satisfied. The following subsections address the principal cases adopting these 
interpretations.   
A. Many Cases Treat the Second (Actual Knowledge) Prong as Irrelevant if the First 
Prong Is Satisfied 
At the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage many decisions ignore allegations 
or even proof of actual knowledge that the projection was incorrect if the defendant’s conduct 
satisfied the first prong of the safe harbor, that is, the defendant identified the forward-looking 
statements as such and accompanied them with what the court found to be meaningful cautionary 
statements.  For example, in Miller v. Champion Enterprises, Inc. the court stated, “[I]f the 
statement qualifies as ‘forward-looking’ and is accompanied by sufficient cautionary language, a 
defendant’s statement is protected regardless of the actual state of mind.”115  Calling the result 
                                                 
115 346 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2003). The court followed Ivax, 182 F.3d at 803 (“if a 
statement is accompanied by ‘meaningful cautionary language,’ the defendants’ state of mind is 
irrelevant”).  After finding that the challenged forward-looking statements were accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary language, the court in Miller found that “the statements are subject to the 
safe harbor provisions of the PSLRA and are therefore not actionable. No investigation of 
defendant’s state of mind is required.” 346 F.3d at 678.  This remains the approach within the 
Sixth Circuit. See, e.g., Humana, 2009 WL 1767193, at *10, *15.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed its adherence to the approach taken in Ivax. Howard J. 
Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, Inc., 2010 WL 154519, at *9-10 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 
2010) (emphasizing the disjunctive nature of the subclauses of the safe harbor and holding that 
“an allegation of actual knowledge of falsity will not deprive a defendant of protection by the 
statutory safe harbor if his forward-looking statements are accompanied by meaningful 
cautionary language” and stating that “the plaintiff's inability to show knowledge of falsity is 
only relevant if the defendant is unable to produce meaningful cautionary statements or evidence 
of immateriality.”). But see within the Eleventh Circuit Primavera v. Liquidmetal Technologies, 
Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (ruling that allegations of actual knowledge 
preclude application of the safe harbor, apparently notwithstanding the presence of meaningful 
cautionary statements). 
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“surprising,” the First Circuit adopted the same interpretation.116  A district court within the 
Seventh Circuit described the conclusion “counterintuitive” but was “compelled” to apply it 
under the plain meaning of the statute.117  These cases essentially rely on an explicit rigid 
application of the disjunctive wording of the safe harbor.118 
                                                 
116 In re Stone & Webster, Inc. Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 212 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The 
statute thus seems to provide a surprising rule that the maker of knowingly false and wilfully 
fraudulent forward-looking statements, designed to deceive investors, escapes liability for the 
fraud if the statement is ‘identified as a forward-looking statement and [was] accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to 
differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement.’ [quoting statute] ”).  This court 
elaborated on its analysis by observing that a lie about a present fact that relates to the accuracy 
of a projection would not be protected by the safe harbor for forward-looking statements. The 
court gave the example of an issuer of securities in a business with an obvious risk of liability 
that states it has procured liability insurance in amounts sufficient to cover the maximum 
anticipated liability. If the aspect of the statement alleged to be fraudulent “lies not in the 
estimate of likely liabilities, but in the fact that the issuer was lying in stating that it had obtained 
insurance,” the safe harbor would not protect the false statement of present fact. Id. at 213.  A 
district court in the Eighth Circuit recently followed Stone & Webster: 
The Court finds that application of the first safe harbor does not involve an 
inquiry into the speaker’s state of mind, but instead is limited to whether the 
cautionary language is adequate and whether the challenged statement is solely 
forward-looking and predictive, as opposed to an arguably forward-looking 
statement that also contains representations as to present facts. 
Western Washington Laborers, 2009 WL 3756619, at *2 (footnote omitted).   
 
117 Desai, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 843-44: 
[A]re we really to believe that Congress, in the course of tightening the standards 
of pleading and proof in private lawsuits claiming securities violations, intended 
to immunize deliberate liars from liability to those who invested in securities on 
the strength of such lies and suffered major losses? That would appear to subvert 
the long-established principles of fraud-based liability. 
Yet this Court also finds itself compelled to answer “Yes” to what should 
have seemed a rhetorical question calling for a “No” response. . . . [T]he 
unambiguous language of [Section 21E(c)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act] itself 
dictates that outcome – it requires only a forward-looking statement (whether true 
or false) plus an accompanying meaningful cautionary statement.  
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B. Some Cases Treat the Second Prong as Pertinent Even if the First Prong Has Been 
– or May Be – Satisfied 
In contrast to the cases described in Part IV.A, a number of cases deem the second prong 
of the safe harbor – that the defendant acted with actual knowledge of the falsity of the forward-
looking statement – pertinent even if the first prong was, or might be, established.  In dictum in 
No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West Holding Corp. 
the court stated that a “strong inference of actual knowledge” will “except[] [purportedly 
forward-looking] statements from the safe harbor rule altogether.”119  Other courts have come to 
                                                                                                                                                             
The holding in Desai is consistent with prior decisions within the Seventh Circuit. See In re 
Midway Games, Inc. Sec. Litig., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that state 
of mind is irrelevant if the first prong is satisfied); Sandmire v. Alliant Energy Corp., 296 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 958 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (“Proof of knowledge that a forward-looking statement was 
false relates to a separate and distinct safe harbor provision, § 78u-5(c)(1)(B). Such knowledge 
and the state of mind of the defendants at the time the statement was made are irrelevant to a safe 
harbor defense based on cautionary language.”). 
 
118 See also Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (“The safe harbor has two independent prongs: one focusing on the defendant’s 
cautionary statements and the other on the defendant’s state of mind”) (dictum); In re Williams 
Sec. Litig., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1206, (N.D. Okl. 2003) (“The safe harbor of the PSLRA provides 
two primary paths by which a defendant may avoid liability. [Citing PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra 
note 21, at 43] The application of the safe harbor under the “actual knowledge” prong does not 
depend on the use of cautionary language, and the application under the “cautionary language” 
prong does not depend upon a defendant’s state of mind. [Citing PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 
21, at 47].”) (dictum); Yellen v. Hake, 437 F. Supp. 2d 941, 961 (S.D. Ia. 2006) (“the statute is 
worded in the disjunctive”). 
119 320 F.3d 920, 937 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003).  Cases applying this dictum include In re Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Sec. Litig., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that while 
some courts have declined to follow America West as dicta, “The parties have not cited, nor has 
the Court found, any subsequent Ninth Circuit authority contradicting the statutory interpretation 
in America West”); In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1250 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(holding that where plaintiff alleges that the statements were made with actual knowledge of 
their falsity “it does not matter whether or not the statements were forward-looking or were 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements”).  An unpublished decision of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held, without citation to America West, that a forward-
looking statement that satisfies the first prong cannot give rise to liability “regardless of 
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a similar conclusion.120  These courts treat the two prongs to operate so that the claim may 
proceed if either the forward-looking statement identified as such was not accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary statements or the plaintiff alleges actual knowledge of the falsity of the 
statement.  These courts do not directly address the disjunctive grammatical structure of the 
statute. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Defendants’ state of mind.” Winick v. Pac. Gateway Exchange, 73 Fed. Appx. 250, 253 (9th Cir. 
2003), withdrawn pursuant to settlement, 80 Fed. Appx. 1 (9th Cir. 2003). 
120 See, e.g., Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 244 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating in 
dictum that allegation of actual knowledge would preclude reliance on the safe harbor even if 
there were meaningful cautionary statements).  Though that court cited Southland, supra note 
118, that court did not address the different perspective on the interpretation of the 
interrelationship of the prongs of the safe harbor in the two decisions.  
See also Gargiulo v. Isolagen, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“though 
some of the statements are forward-looking and contain cautionary language, they are still not 
protected by the PSLRA safe harbor because Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had actual 
knowledge of falsity”); Andropolis v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 662, 
676 (D. Colo. 2007) (stating in dictum that even a forward-looking statement made with 
meaningful cautionary statements may be actionable if there are sufficient allegations of actual 
knowledge of the falsity of the statement); In re Alliance Pharm. Corp. Sec. Litig., 279 F. Supp. 
2d 171, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating in dictum that the safe harbor provision of the PSLRA does 
not protect a defendant from liability if a statement was knowingly false when made even if there 
were adequate cautionary statements); Schaffer v. Evolving Systems, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 
1224 (D. Colo. 1998) (“Plaintiffs correctly argue that the safe harbor provision provides no 
refuge for Defendants who make statements with ‘actual knowledge’ of their falsity,” even 
though the court decided the statement was “accompanied by sufficiently specific cautionary 
language”).  See also In re Cambrex Corp. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2840336, at *8 (D. N.J. Oct. 27, 
2005) (“Even if the warnings were sufficient, the safe harbor is not available when the forward-
looking statements are made by or with the approval of an executive officer of that entity who 
had actual knowledge that the statement was false or misleading, as is alleged to be the case 
here”), relying upon In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999), which 
had stated that the safe harbor would not apply if the statement was made with actual knowledge 
of its falsity.  Insofar as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is concerned, however, at the 
appellate level the issue of the relationship between the two prongs is undecided. Institutional 
Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 259 (3d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Advanta on the 
ground that in Advanta there was no cautionary language to consider).  
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C. Some Cases Find that Actual Knowledge of the Falsity of the Forward-Looking 
Statement Precludes a Finding that Meaningful Cautionary Statements were Made 
within the Meaning of the First Prong of the Safe Harbor 
There is a third perspective, which essentially seeks to meld the two prongs by ruling that 
an allegation of undisclosed actual knowledge of falsity of the forward-looking statement means, 
ipso facto, that the cautionary statements were not meaningful.  The principal case adopting this 
approach is In re SeeBeyond Technologies Corp. Sec. Litig.121  After rejecting the statement in 
America West as dictum122 and noting that the two prongs of the safe harbor operate 
independently, the court went on to state:123 
[S]ubsection [Section 21E(c)(1)](A)’s requirement that meaningful cautionary 
language accompany the forward-looking statement severely limits the possibility 
that false or misleading statements could be made with actual knowledge and yet 
be protected under the safe harbor provision. If the forward-looking statement is 
made with actual knowledge that it is false or misleading, the accompanying 
cautionary language can only be meaningful if it either states the belief of the 
speaker that it is false or misleading or, at the very least, clearly articulates the 
reasons why it is false or misleading. These are undeniably “important factors that 
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking 
statement . . . .” [Citing Section 21E(c))1)(A)(i)] Only if such information is 
included can the cautionary language be “meaningful.” 
In a footnote to this passage, the court addressed a criticism that this analysis “improperly 
imports a state of mind element into subsection (A),”124 stating:125 
Whether cautionary language is meaningful, in that it identifies important factors, 
can only be understood with reference to the defendant’s knowledge of relevant 
factors. This result follows from the fact that courts and Congress have made clear 
                                                 
121 266 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 2003). 
122 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
123 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1165-66 (footnote omitted). 
124 Id. at 1165 n.8. 
125 Id. at 1166 n.8 (emphasis in original) 
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that mere boilerplate cautionary language will not do. [Citations omitted]  
Moreover, whether a specific factor is “important” and therefore should be listed, 
likely should not be evaluated by an objective standard (i.e. what the defendant 
should have known).  If an objective standard is adopted for determining whether 
a factor is “important,” then it seems this would heighten the bar of the first prong 
of the safe harbor provision, making it more difficult for defendants to take 
advantage of its grant of immunity. This result seems contrary to congressional 
intent.126 Instead, it appears as though a determination of whether “important” 
factors have been identified should be made with reference to those factors of 
which the speaker is aware – things that the speaker believes may cause actual 
results to vary. Therefore, it appears as though the cautionary statement cannot be 
evaluated without reference to the defendant’s knowledge.  
While it is undisputed that a speaker need not identify all of the factors 
that may cause actual results to differ from a prediction, a speaker with actual 
knowledge that a prediction is false or misleading must identify the basis for the 
misleading or false nature of the prediction, as surely this is an important factor 
that could - perhaps undoubtedly will - make actual results differ materially from 
those in the forward-looking statement. 
It may also be argued that this reading of [Section 21E(c)(1)] obliterates 
the distinction between subsections (A) and (B), as the key element under both 
prongs seems to simply be whether the plaintiff alleges that the defendant had 
actual knowledge. The Court disagrees. Subsection (B) sets the standard the 
plaintiff must meet when no cautionary language is present. Subsection (A) may 
still provide safe harbor where cautionary language is used, even if the defendant 
has actual knowledge that the statement is false or misleading. The idea that 
sufficient cautionary language may be used when the defendant has actual 
knowledge that a statement is somehow misleading (for instance, where the 
company is engaging in “puffery” of some sort) is not so far-fetched. On a related 
note, the two-prong construction of the safe harbor provision may be explained by 
the fact that Congress was perhaps looking to the existing “bespeaks caution” 
doctrine when enacting subsection (A), while seeking to place a heightened 
burden on plaintiffs when enacting subsection (B). 
In assessing the accuracy of the statement that Congress may have been “looking to” the 
bespeaks doctrine when enacting the first prong of the safe harbor, one must take into account 
that at least one line of bespeaks caution cases rejects the relevance of the alleged actual 
                                                 
126 The preceding language in this quotation is in effect a rejection of the approach 
applied by the Seventh Circuit in Asher, which reflected that discovery would be necessary, at 
least in some cases, to determine objectively what the important factors were at the time the 
statements were made. See supra note 37. 
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knowledge of the falsity of the forward-looking statement.127  The fact that Congress modeled 
the first prong after Trump128 strongly suggests that it accepted the approach of that case that 
state of mind is not relevant to the application of the bespeaks caution doctrine.129   
SeeBeyond is simply not reconcilable with the cases discussed in Part IV.A, and the case 
cannot be criticized for failure to take into account the statements in the Conference Report on 
which those cases rely.130  One respect in which the decision seems to have applied a policy 
rationale that may be at odds with expressed Congressional intent, however, is the court’s 
interpretation, to use the court’s own words, of the principle that to satisfy the first prong “a 
speaker need not identify all of the factors that may cause actual results to differ from a 
prediction.”131  This is a reference to the statement in the Conference Report that the speaker 
need not identify “all factors” that “could cause results to differ materially” from the 
projection.132  The Conference Report continued, “Failure to include the particular factor that 
ultimately causes the forward-looking statement not to come true will not mean that the 
statement is not protected by the safe harbor,”133  and, “The Conference Committee specifies that 
the cautionary statements identify ‘important’ factors to provide guidance to issuers and not to 
                                                 
127 See supra text accompanying notes 111-112. 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 105-106. 
129 See supra text accompanying notes 105-113 and infra text accompanying notes 159-
163 and 203-209. 
130 See 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1165-66 n.8 (discussing legislative history and selected 
commentary). 
131 See supra text accompanying note 125.   
132 PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743. 
133 Id. 
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provide an opportunity for plaintiff counsel to conduct discovery on what factors were known to 
the issuer at the time the forward-looking statement was made.”134 SeeBeyond concludes, 
however, “[A] speaker with actual knowledge that a prediction is false or misleading must 
identify the basis for the misleading or false nature of the prediction, as surely this is an 
important factor.”135  SeeBeyond thus expressly imposes a requirement that one type of factor 
can never be omitted and thus that, before a claim is dismissed, the plaintiff should be allowed to 
inquire into what the speaker knew at the time the statement was made, concepts that are at odds 
with statements of Congressional intent in the Conference Report just quoted. 
SeeBeyond has been followed within the Ninth Circuit136 and elsewhere.137  No case has 
been found directly rebutting its analysis.  One court expressed an inclination to follow the ruling 
in SeeBeyond but concluded that it was constrained by the “statutory language.”138 
                                                 
134 Id. (emphasis added). 
135 See supra text accompanying note 125, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 n.8 (emphasis added).   
136 See, e.g., Rosenbaum Capital LLC v. McNulty, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1190-91 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
137 In re Nash Finch Co. 502 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873 (D. Minn. 2007) (“This Court 
concludes that cautionary language can not be ‘meaningful’ when defendants know that the 
potential risks they have identified have in fact already occurred, and that the positive statements 
they are making are false,” citing SeeBeyond); Freeland v. Iridium World Communications, Ltd, 
545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 74 (D.D.C. 2008) (following SeeBeyond in denying summary judgment 
because of issues of fact regarding defendants’ intent that bear on whether cautionary statements 
were “meaningful”).  A decision in the latter court in the period between SeeBeyond and Iridium 
had held, however, without any discussion of SeeBeyond, that state of mind is irrelevant if there 
are meaningful cautionary statements. XM Satellite, 479 F. Supp. 2d  at 186 n.14.  Iridium 
rejected the conclusion in XM. 545 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (noting that there was no controlling 
decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia). 
138 In re Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 3390052, at *3 n.4. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 
2004) (stating that the analysis in SeeBeyond “is sound and should be adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit.  However, in light of the statutory language and the present state of the case law, the 
Court cannot adopt this argument”). 
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One decision of dubious merit, within the Second Circuit, has expressed a view 
somewhat similar to that developed more fully in SeeBeyond, stating that “no degree of 
cautionary language will protect material misrepresentations or omissions where defendants 
knew their statements were false when made.”139  The flaw in that case is that the decision on 
which it relied dealt with the bespeaks caution doctrine, not the statutory safe harbor.140 
Other courts appear to conclude that when there is a close question whether the 
cautionary statements satisfy the first prong, allegations of actual knowledge of the falsity tilt the 
balance against applying the first prong.  Thus, one court stated, “Taken together, the facts of the 
complaint suggest the Defendants had actual knowledge of the problems [undermining the 
forward-looking statement]. In such a situation, vague and insipid cautionary language is 
insufficient to afford the statements protection under PSLRA’s safe harbor provision.”141  Cases 
                                                 
139 In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and “ERISA” Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 223 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), quoting Milman v. Box Hill Systems Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 220, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
140 See Milman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 230-31.  The case involved claims under the Securities 
Act apparently involving an initial public offering, which is not subject to the statutory safe 
harbor.  Section 27A(b)(2)(D) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b)(2)(D) (2000). 
141 In re FirstEnergy Corp. Sec. Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 581, 596 (N.D. Ohio 2004).  The 
cited authority for this statement (In re Prudential Securities Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 72 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)), however, is mischaracterized as presenting an interpretation of the statutory 
safe harbor, when in fact it was applying the bespeaks caution doctrine.  A later case in a 
neighboring district made a similar comment, relying on FirstEnergy and Prudential. In re 
Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 750 (S.D. Ohio 2006).   The result reached 
in FirstEnergy may be difficult to square with the holding by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Miller (see supra text accompanying note 115), which FirstEnergy cited. 316 F. Supp. 2d at 
596. 
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that apply the first prong independently, however, always require more than “vague and insipid 
language,” so that such language is insufficient irrespective of actual knowledge of falsity.142 
D. Summary of the Case Law 
Many courts, some with express reservations, apply the first prong as literally written, 
without addressing what “meaningful” may mean with reference to the defendant’s state of mind.  
Other courts, perhaps acting on the revulsion expressed by some courts in the first cohort, apply 
the second prong to supersede the first, without directly articulating why that is the correct 
analysis.  SeeBeyond offers a reasoned attempt to address both the plain meaning of the two 
prongs and the revulsion factor by holding that cautionary statements cannot ever be 
“meaningful” if the statement was known to be false and the speaker did not include that 
revelation as part of the cautionary statements.  As discussed above, however, thoughtful though 
SeeBeyond is, it is at least in some respects inconsistent with the expression of Congressional 
intent in the Conference Report.143 
V. THE VIEWS OF COMMENTATORS AND THE SEC 
Part IV of this article demonstrates that there is a three-way split among the cases 
regarding whether satisfaction of the first prong of the safe harbor moots the second prong or 
whether, on the contrary, allegations (or proof) of actual knowledge of the falsity of the 
projection preclude application of the first prong of the safe harbor as a complete defense (on one 
of two different approaches).  Commentators likewise have expressed divergent views, and the 
                                                 
142 See, e.g., US Unwired, 565 F.3d at 244 (“the language urged here is boilerplate and 
does not qualify as meaningful cautionary language.  Congress clearly intended that boilerplate 
cautionary language not constitute “meaningful cautionary” language for the purpose of the safe 
harbor analysis.”) 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 131-135. 
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SEC recently filed an amicus brief addressing the safe harbor.  The following subsections present 
the perspectives of a number of authors who have addressed the relevance of the defendant’s 
state of mind to the application of the first prong of the safe harbor and the view of the SEC. 
A. Many Commentators Treat the Second (Actual Knowledge) Prong as Irrelevant if 
the First Prong Is Satisfied 
In an early assessment of the PSLRA safe harbor, one commentator followed the plain 
meaning of the statute, concluding, “Even deliberate omission of one or more important factors 
appears not to subject the issuer to private liability, since some important factors would still be 
identified, just not all of them. Apparently, an issuer could even omit the most likely factors and 
still be protected, provided that the factors which the issuer does state are important.”144 
Another commentator offered the following assessment:145 
Many opponents of the bill repeatedly argued that under this prong of the 
safe harbor, even if an issuer makes a knowingly false prediction of future success 
                                                 
144 Steven J. Spencer, Note, Has Congress Learned Its Lesson? A Plain Meaning Analysis 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99, 118 (1997) 
(footnotes omitted).  The author is, however, critical that there is no “textual basis” for the 
statement in the PSLRA Conf. Rep., on which that author relies, for the statement that state of 
mind is irrelevant under the first prong. Id. at 119.  Nevertheless, he states: 
Strict interpretation of the safe harbor provision shows its two prongs to be 
set forth in the disjunctive. A forward-looking statement is protected either if it is 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements or if the plaintiff fails to prove 
that the statement was made with actual knowledge that it was false or 
misleading. Consequently, a forward-looking statement that is known to be untrue 
can be protected under the safe harbor by the presence of cautionary language. 
This does little to encourage public investment in a company, for any statement 
accompanied by statutorily sufficient cautionary language might be a blatant lie, 
and yet remain protected by the safe harbor.  
Id.  at 121-22 (footnote omitted). 
 
145 Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements After 
Two and a Half Years: Has it Changed the Law?  Has It Achieved What Congress Intended, 76 
WASH. U. L. Q. 645, 657-58 (1998). 
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– that is, false because the defendant actually knew at the time that the projection 
would be impossible to achieve – the forward-looking statement is nevertheless 
immunized from the liability. The Act does indeed provide that a forward-looking 
statement can be immune from suit irrespective of the state of mind of the 
defendant (which need not even be investigated by the court) if appropriate 
cautionary language is present. That much is perfectly consistent with existing 
law. In Trump and most other cases, the courts make clear that if a forward-
looking statement is qualified with concrete, specific risk disclosures that address 
the factors that may cause results to differ, the forward-looking statement is 
immaterial as a matter of law. It simply does not matter whether the defendants 
made the projections in good faith. 
I would submit that, however anomalous the result may seem on the facts 
of a particular case, this result is correct as a matter of policy as well. The theory 
of the Act – like that of much prior case law146 – is that no reasonable investor 
could rely on a forward-looking statement in light of specific attendant risk 
disclosures, so a prediction that is adequately hedged with concrete cautionary 
language simply is not material. 
In succeeding years, that commentator has closely followed case law developments under the 
statutory safe harbor and maintained his view that state of mind has no bearing on the application 
of the first prong.147 
Another commentator has concluded:148 
Because these three Safe Harbor provisions work independently of one another, 
the corporation’s state of mind is irrelevant under the first two provisions. In other 
                                                 
146 As noted earlier, some cases differed from Trump by taking the defendant’s state of 
mind into account when applying the bespeaks caution doctrine. See supra text accompanying 
notes 111-112. 
147 See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking 
Statements: A Scorecard in the Courts from November 2004 through November 2006, 39 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 54 (Jan. 15, 2007) (“Under a plain reading of the PSLRA, the safe harbor 
can apply to forward-looking statements even if the defendant knew the forward-looking 
statements were false. . . .  Despite the statute’s plain language, there is a rather surprising 
ongoing circuit split over whether a defendant who is alleged to have had actual knowledge that 
a statement was false when made may still obtain safe harbor protection.) (footnote omitted). 
148 Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying 
Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 929, 933 
(2005). 
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words, corporate executives can knowingly lie to the market by making a 
forward-looking statement they are fully aware will never materialize, so long as 
they attach meaningful cautionary language to warn the market of the potential 
risks of the investment.  
Thus, the plain meaning approach that maintains an impenetrable separation between the two 
prongs has strong adherents among the commentators as well as the courts. 
B. Some Commentators Urge that Actual Knowledge of the Falsity of the Forward-
Looking Statement Be Taken into Account in Determining Whether the First 
Prong of the Safe Harbor Applies 
In an article published shortly after the passage of the PSLRA, Professor John Coffee 
rejected as “unseemly” an interpretation of the first prong that would protect “knowing 
falsehoods.”149  He would “read ‘meaningful’ to require that the cautionary statements provide 
corrective disclosure that offset or at least significantly dilute the false statement.  That is, 
                                                 
149 Coffee, supra note 35, 51 BUS. LAW.  at 989.  Professor Coffee was an immediate 
critic of the final legislation, urging that the President veto it, claiming that under the safe harbor 
set forth in the Conference Report “even if a knowingly false statement is made, the defendant 
escapes liability if ‘meaningful cautionary statements’ are added to the forward-looking 
statement. This is bad enough, but under the proposed legislative history there now appears to be 
no obligation to disclose the most important reasons why the forward-looking statement may 
prove false (so long as some ‘important factors’ are indicated.).” Letter from John C. Coffee, Jr. 
to President Clinton (Dec. 6, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. 38201-02 (Dec. 21, 1995). See 
also supra note 100 (referring to Professor Coffee’s position during Senate debate).  Professor 
Coffee’s proposed reading of the statute published in 1996 thus seems at odds with his 
interpretation of the language when it was before Congress less than a year earlier. 
Professor Coffee had been an advocate of a safe harbor that would protect a forward-
looking statement that “contains or is closely accompanied by clear and specific cautionary 
language that explains in detail sufficient to inform a reasonable person of the level of risk 
associated with, or inherent in, the statement and that identifies the specific basis for such 
statement and for such level of risk.” See Concept Release, supra note 16, 59 FED. REG. 52723, 
52734-75 (reproducing proposal made by Professor Coffee).  Professor Coffee’s proposed safe 
harbor would not by its terms have been dependent upon the speaker’s state of mind.  In 
particular, as the SEC explained, that proposed safe harbor “would not require that the forward-
looking statement have a ‘reasonable basis’ (as under existing Rules 175 and 3b-6) because, 
according to Professor Coffee, this requirement often raises factual issues that cannot easily be 
resolved at the pre-trial state.” Id. at 52730. 
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statements that did not correct or minimize the lie are arguably not ‘meaningful.’”150  He 
acknowledged, however, that if the first prong does not protect knowingly false statements, some 
non-redundant interpretation must be given to the second prong.  This would result in 
interpreting the first prong so that a knowingly false statement would be protected only when it 
had been rendered immaterial or incapable of reasonable reliance, essentially by disclosing the 
false nature of the projection, and a recklessly (but not knowingly) false forward-looking 
statement would be protected by the second prong, even if it was not qualified by “meaningful” 
cautionary statements.151  Professor Coffee acknowledged that the stated purpose of the statutory 
safe harbor was “likely” to “go well beyond the ‘bespeaks caution’ case law” but claimed it 
would not to go so far as protect a defendant from liability for a “knowingly false statement 
unaccompanied by a special qualification.”152 
                                                 
150 Coffee, supra note 35, 51 BUS. LAW. at 989. 
151 Coffee, supra note 35, 51 BUS. LAW. at 989-90.  Professor Coffee would give 
independent meaning to the “immaterial” test in Section 21E(c)(1)(A)(ii) by interpreting the first 
prong to render the statement immaterial because it is qualified by meaningful cautionary 
statements, with the separate “immaterial” test applying where the statement is not material for 
some independent reason. Id. at 990-91. See supra text accompanying note 35 (quoting 
Conference Report on inclusion of the separate “immaterial” test and quoting Professor Coffee’s 
recount of one aspect of the history of the drafting of that subclause). 
152 Coffee, supra note 35, 51 BUS. LAW at 990.  In this discussion, Professor Coffee 
asserted that the bespeaks caution cases did not protect knowingly false statements. Id. & n.75.  
(The reference there is to note 55 earlier in the cited text, an apparent miscitation for note 64.)  
As discussed earlier in this article, however, the bespeaks caution case law as of the time of 
enactment of the PSLRA was not so clear as Professor Coffee suggests, and some cases rejected 
any state of mind component in the bespeaks caution doctrine. See supra notes 111-112.  
Professor Coffee cited (id. at 987 n.64) only Isquith v. Middle S. Util., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 203 
(5th Cir. 1988), and Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 489 (3d Cir. 1994), neither 
of which was discussed by Professor Langevoort in his 1994 article on bespeaks caution 
discussed supra note 111. Isquith at least suggests that a statement that bespoke caution is not 
actionable whether or not it was made in good faith: 
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Urging a comparable approach, one author states in the current edition of his treatise:153 
A quick reading of the statute might lead one to conclude that a defendant can 
make a forward looking statement with actual knowledge of its falsity and escape 
liability by identifying the statement as forward looking and adding “meaningful 
cautionary statements.”  Courts should avoid this bizarre result by classifying any 
cautionary statement as not “meaningful” – and thus denying access to the safe 
harbor – when the statement’s maker has actual knowledge of the falsity.  Such a 
result is within the literal wording of Section [21E](c)(1)(B). 
Speaking with reference to the bespeaks caution doctrine, another leading securities law 
commentator stated:154 
A cautionary statement found in a risk factor or disclaimer should be given no 
weight if the defendants were aware (or should have been aware) of a prospective 
negative material fact and chose not to disclose it. The bespeaks caution doctrine, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Most often, whether liability is imposed depends on whether the predictive 
statement was “false” when it was made. The answer to this inquiry, however, 
does not turn on whether the prediction in fact proved to be wrong; instead, falsity 
is determined by examining the nature of the prediction – with the emphasis on 
whether the prediction suggested reliability, bespoke caution, was made in good 
faith, or had a sound factual or historical basis. 
847 F.2d at 203-204 (emphasis added).  Kline (which purported to follow, though in this respect 
may not be consistent with, Trump, also in the Third Circuit) does support Professor Coffee’s 
interpretation of the bespeaks caution doctrine. 
 
 It is also notable that the leading general treatise on the federal securities laws interprets 
the bespeaks caution doctrine as inapplicable where the speaker knows the projection is false but 
views the question to be open whether actual knowledge of falsity of the projection would 
preclude reliance on the first prong of the statutory safe harbor. 4 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & 
TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 644 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that under the bespeaks 
caution doctrine “[a] cautionary statement found in a risk factor or disclaimer should be given no 
weight if the defendants were aware (or should have been aware) of a prospective negative 
material fact and chose not to disclose it”) and 2 id. at 100 (4th ed. 2007) (observing, with 
express reservations, that under the statutory safe harbor “appropriate cautionary language may 
render even a knowing misstatement or omission immaterial”). 
 
153 5 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS  § 
3:31, at 3-152 to -153 (2009) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).  
154 Joel Seligman, The SEC’s Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1953, 1978 (1995).   
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in other words, should not be a device by which defendants can obscure or 
misrepresent prospective bad news. 
After the statutory safe harbor was adopted, that author observed that the first prong “may 
immunize a deliberately false forward looking statement if the court concludes it was 
accompanied ‘by meaningful cautionary statements.’ . . . . If courts narrowly construe the term 
‘meaningful cautionary statement’ language when confronted with deliberate fraud, much 
mischief can be avoided.”155   
An early commentator on the PSLRA observed that the first prong “[r]ead literally . . . 
would protect forward-looking statements that were known to be false and misleading when 
made.”156  He continued, however:157 
As a practical matter, while the presence of cautionary statements may serve to 
avoid lengthy discovery on the issue of knowledge, if the plaintiff can adequately 
plead that the forward-looking statement was known to be false when made, it 
may be difficult for the defendant to win a dismissal on the grounds that the 
cautionary statements were “meaningful.”158 
                                                 
155 Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 
733 (1996). 
156 John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 355-56 (1996). 
157 Id. at 356. 
158 Another commentator seems to urge simultaneous conflicting positions.  After 
observing that “forward-looking statements surrounded by ‘meaningful cautionary statements’ 
will be insulted from challenge even if knowingly false,” he continues, “A false projection lacks 
a reasonable basis.  To the extent that a company knows that the projection lacks a reasonable 
basis, the meaningful cautionary statements would have to indicate the ‘unreasonable’ 
assumptions.” J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 6A.04[3], 
at 6A-20.2 to -20.3 (3d ed. 2010) (footnotes omitted). 
 
 -50-  
A more recent extensive exegesis of the statutory safe harbor by Hugh Beck159 focuses on 
an analysis of Trump160 and argues that Trump departed from earlier formulations of the 
bespeaks caution doctrine in determining that cautionary statements may render a false 
projection immaterial.161  Beck contends that prior to Trump the courts that applied a bespeaks 
caution doctrine did so with a focus on falsity, not materiality.162 At the same time, he concedes 
                                                 
159 At the time Beck was a member of the staff of the SEC and his discussion was 
accompanied by the appropriate disclaimer that his views do not necessarily reflect those of the 
SEC. Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 161 n.1 
160 See supra notes 19-20. 
161 Beck, supra note 104, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 190-95.  Beck states that Trump “[f]ail[ed] 
to perceive the common doctrinal framework underlying the holdings in the previous bespeaks 
caution cases . . . . ” Id. at 191.  (Beck’s understanding of the “common doctrinal framework” is 
set forth infra note 162.)  An article published ten years earlier, which Beck does not cite, also 
concluded that Congress adopted a materiality-based approach to the safe harbor. O’Hare, supra 
note 105, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. at 641.  O’Hare concluded that the statutory “safe harbor protects 
an issuer who did not believe its forward-looking statement because it was aware of important 
risks, but failed to disclose them to the public.” Id.  at 665.  
162 Id.  at 175-81.  Beck states: 
The [traditional] framework’s underlying assumption is that disclosures of 
forward-looking information tend to influence investor behavior. Accordingly, the 
finder of fact preliminarily assumes the materiality of the forward-looking 
statement in question and focuses on determining whether the statement was false 
or misleading. This determination is made by evaluating whether a ‘‘reasonable’’ 
investor would have drawn from the publication of the forward-looking statement 
the incorrect inferences that allegedly misled the plaintiff. To the extent a 
reasonable investor would have drawn those inferences they constitute implied 
misrepresentations, which render the forward-looking statement itself false or 
misleading. Any definitive evaluation of the materiality of the forward-looking 
statement prior to this falsity analysis is premature because the materiality (or 
immateriality) of any aspects of the statement other than such implied 
misrepresentations has no impact on the statement’s actionability. In other words, 
under this traditional framework, until the finder of fact determines how a 
forward-looking statement was false, it cannot determine whether that falsity was 
material and therefore actionable. 
Id. at 165-66. 
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that in formulating the safe harbor Congress was guided in large measure by Trump and its 
progeny, not what he refers to as the “traditional” cases.163  He concludes, nevertheless, that 
application of the PSLRA safe harbor “does not clearly require a materiality-driven approach to 
evaluating whether an issuer should be liable if a published prediction turns out to be wrong.”164  
From a policy perspective, “The most obvious problem with reading the first safe harbor 
provision as a formula for rendering predictive information immaterial is the inability of this 
                                                 
163  Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 196.  Beck acknowledges that the Trump 
(materiality) formulation of the bespeaks caution doctrine “was quickly absorbed into the case 
law of other circuits” reflecting “widespread judicial acceptance of the Third Circuit’s 
materiality-driven bespeaks caution doctrine [which] gradually spilled over into ongoing 
congressional deliberations” regarding securities litigation reform. Id. at 195.  He continues: 
[T]here is no indication that any of the legislators considered that the legal 
relevance of accompanying statements could be conceptualized in any terms other 
than materiality.  Rather, it appears that members of Congress took as granted 
Trump’s assertion that the primary relevance of accompanying cautionary 
language is its impact on a projection’s materiality because none of the cases 
subsequent to Trump questioned this assertion. 
Id. at 196.  Indeed, in explaining the inclusion of the separate “immaterial” safe harbor, the 
Conference Report states that this allows protection for a statement that is immaterial “on other 
grounds.” PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743 (emphasis added).  
This can only mean that the first prong sets forth a test of immateriality. 
 
 For a recent expression of the bespeaks caution doctrine as both a foundation for the first 
prong of the statutory safe harbor and with origins in a materiality-based approach, see Goodman 
Life, 2010 WL 154519, at *11: 
 
Our conclusion [that state of mind is irrelevant to the meaningful 
cautionary statement element of the safe harbor] is further informed by this 
circuit’s judicially created bespeaks caution doctrine, whose “statutory 
equivalent” is the PSLRA safe harbor provision. [Citation omitted]; see also 
[PSLRA Conf. Rep. at 43, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 742] (noting that the safe harbor 
provision “is based on aspects of . . . the judicial created ‘bespeaks caution’ 
doctrine”). Under the bespeaks caution doctrine, a forward-looking statement is 
rendered immaterial as a matter of law when accompanied by meaningful 
cautionary language.  
164 Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 197. 
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approach to connect the provision to the safe harbor’s stated policy goal of enhancing allocative 
efficiency.”165  By this Beck means “the allocation of capital to its best use [which] requires 
securities prices that reflect available information regarding companies’ business prospects. 
Accordingly, an increase in forward-looking information disclosures enhances allocative 
efficiency only to the extent that the disclosures influence the investor decisions that determine 
security prices.”166  He finds the first prong of the safe harbor lacking to the extent that – if by 
hypothesis the meaningful cautionary statements render the projection immaterial – companies 
will simply increase the disclosure of “immaterial information [that] will have little impact on 
the accuracy of equity prices on which allocative efficiency depends.”167  As a prescriptive 
matter, that may bear consideration, but it flies in the face of the balance of the legislative 
history. 
                                                 
165 Id. at 198 (footnote omitted). 
166 Id. at 164 n.11. The safe harbor is intended to achieve this goal by increasing the 
disclosure of forward-looking disclosures. Id. at 165, citing PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 
43, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 742.  The Conference Report stated that the safe harbor is intended “to 
enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forward-looking information.” 
Id. 
167 Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 198.  It is tautological that if the cautionary 
statements render the forward-looking statements immaterial then the statement as a whole is, 
under the definition of materiality, one that lacks a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider the information important in making an investment decision. See 
supra note 18.  At the same time, the safe harbor was intended to encourage public companies to 
make forward-looking statements (see supra note 21) , presumably ones of meaningful content to 
investors. If there is a tension between encouraging issuers to make informative statements that 
are, at the same time, sufficiently qualified to be immaterial, that is simply a legislative judgment 
that courts should not second-guess.  Investors can decide for themselves how much reliance to 
place on projections, choosing to ignore the cautions if they wish, but they must recognize that 
adequately qualified projections will not provide the basis for a claim of material deception. 
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Beck sought to develop an interpretation of the three safe harbors (including the one that 
the statement is “immaterial”168) that does not render any one of the safe harbors superfluous.169  
He recognizes that a Trump-based interpretation of the first prong would preserve independent 
significance for the actual knowledge prong because adequately qualified forward-looking 
statements would be protected even if the speaker had knowledge of the falsity.170  He finds this 
approach wanting, however, because a conclusion under the first prong that the forward-looking 
statement is “immaterial” would, he asserts, render the separately stated “immaterial” safe harbor 
superfluous.171  This article has already shown, however, that the “immaterial” safe harbor in 
Section 21E(c)(1)(A)(ii) has independent significance from the first prong.172  
Beck argues that a Trump-based framework would not be a “reasonable construction[] of 
the statutory language” because it would permit “meaningful cautionary statements” to exclude 
“contingencies management knows are more likely to cause departure from projected results.”173  
This criticism, however, is somewhat undermined by the statement in the PSLRA Conference 
                                                 
168 See, e.g., Section 21E(c)(1)(A)(ii) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
5(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
169 Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 199-204. 
170 Id. at 199. 
171 Id. at 200 n. 131.  Beck quibbles that if the Trump approach was the guidepost for 
Congress, Congress should have included only two components to the safe harbor, one being 
immateriality and the other lack of actual knowledge. Id.  The fact that Congress chose to include 
alternative approaches leading to a conclusion of immateriality, as discussed infra text 
accompanying note 172, is not a basis for rejecting the conclusion that the first prong presents an 
unqualified test for immateriality. 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36 and note 151.  Beck’s article does not 
contain any mention of the puffery doctrine of immateriality. 
173 Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 199. 
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Report that the safe harbor is available even if the contingency that ultimately undermines the 
projection was not disclosed.174  Read literally, this explanation by the Conference Committee 
means that omitting from the meaningful cautionary statements a “factor known to the issuer” 
would not preclude successful reliance on the safe harbor.  While this part of Beck’s analysis 
may be in accord with Asher, which requires disclosure of the “principal” contingencies in order 
to rely on the safe harbor175 – a criterion that would surely include known falsity – the Asher 
approach has not become the dominant one for applying the first prong of the safe harbor.176  
Beck draws a distinction between lack of belief in the statement in determining whether 
the statement is misleading and actual knowledge that it is false.  Lack of belief in the statement 
would not render the statement misleading, so that it could still be protected by the first prong of 
the safe harbor, whereas lack of belief would leave the statement vulnerable under the “actual 
                                                 
174 PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743: 
Failure to include the particular factor that ultimately causes the forward-looking 
statement not to come true will not mean that the statement is not protected by the 
safe harbor.  The Conference Committee specifies that the cautionary statements 
identify “important” factors to provide guidance to issuers and not to provide an 
opportunity for plaintiff counsel to conduct discovery on what factors were known 
to the issuer at the time the forward-looking statement was made. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
175 See supra note 37, and Asher, 377 F.3d at 734. 
176 See supra note 37.  Beck asserts that under his interpretation of the safe harbor “the 
omission of an important factor or even of the most important factor would not automatically 
render the remaining disclosures meaningless, particularly where disclosure of such information 
would substantially undermine the company’s competitive position. On the other hand, an 
omission of one of the most important factors that can only be explained by management’s intent 
to mislead investors ought to render the remaining statements meaningless.” Beck, supra note 
105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 201 n. 132. 
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knowledge” prong.177  In the end, however, Beck acknowledges that proof that a forward-looking 
statement lacked meaningful cautionary statements will substantially overlap proof of actual 
knowledge of falsity.178  This strongly suggests, to him, that in practice there should be very little 
distinction between the two (principal) prongs of the safe harbor.  
Beck’s analysis is based on several faulty premises, not the least of which is that he 
criticizes the materiality-driven approach to the bespeaks caution doctrine in Trump yet, as he 
acknowledges, that is the foundation for Congress’s adoption of the first prong of the statutory 
safe harbor.179  That is, irrespective of whether Beck’s criticism of Trump itself is well-founded, 
or whether Beck’s policy analysis is in accord with Congressional intent, it is Trump on which 
Congress undeniably based its approach.  The interpretation and application of the statutory safe 
harbor must be based on the words Congress chose in the statute and, secondarily, its intent in 
                                                 
177 Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 202-203, relying upon Virginia 
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095-96 (1991) (holding that a misstatement of 
one’s belief in a statement, a psychological fact, would not be a “misleading” statement that 
could provide the basis for a claim under Rule 10b-5). 
178 Beck states: 
[I]n most cases where evidence adduced demonstrates management’s “actual 
knowledge” that a prediction was false, the same evidence will also demonstrate 
that statements accompanying the prediction were not “meaningful” because they 
failed to prevent important incorrect inferences a reasonable investor would have 
drawn about the probability of a departure of actual results from the predicted 
outcome.  Accordingly, as managers perpetrating a fraud through the use of 
baseless predictions leave a trail of “actual knowledge” evidence they will 
generally be unable to avoid creating evidence of the “meaninglessness” of the 
statements accompanying the predictions at the same time. 
Id. at 204 (footnote omitted). 
 
179 See supra Part III.F 
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choosing those words.  Congress having enacted the words of Trump, what Trump meant is what 
the statute means.180 
C. The SEC Urges that Application of the First Prong Take into Account Knowledge 
of Historical Facts Bearing on the Forward-Looking Statement 
In response to a request from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the SEC 
recently filed a brief amicus curiae in an appeal from the dismissal of a private claim for 
damages under Rule 10b-5 in which that court may address the safe harbor.181  The SEC 
addressed the relevance of the defendant’s state of mind to a determination whether the 
“meaningful cautionary statement” test has been satisfied.  The crux of the SEC’s position is that 
a caution is not meaningful if it warns of a “potentiality that [the defendant] is aware currently 
exists.”182  The SEC sees this as consistent with the statement in the Conference Report that “[a] 
cautionary statement that misstates historical facts is not covered by the Safe [sic] harbor.”183  
The SEC argued that consideration of the defendant’s state of mind in this regard is not 
inconsistent with the emphasis in the Conference Report that the first prong of the safe harbor 
does not permit examining the defendant’s state of mind.184  The SEC urged that the Conference 
                                                 
180 See supra text accompanying notes 106-109. 
181 Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, Slayton v. Am. 
Express Co., No. 08-5442-cv (2d Cir.), filed on January 21, 2010, 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2010/slayton0110.pdf [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief].  The 
decision appealed from is In re American Express Co. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 4501928 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 26, 2008).  The court of appeals’ questions are set forth in the docket entry for the case on 
October 23, 2009. 
182 Id. at 10.   
183 Id., quoting PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743. 
184 SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 181, at 11.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 53 
and 56 (discussing Conference Report comments on irrelevance of the defendant’s state of mind 
under the first prong). 
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Committee’s statements regarding the prohibition on inquiring into the defendant’s state of mind 
were intended to emphasize that the application of the first prong of the safe harbor was not 
conditioned on the defendant’s disclosure of all known risks “where the issuer’s cautionary 
statements are otherwise adequate under the safe harbor . . . .”185   
The SEC’s interpretation of the language in the Conference Report is subject to serious 
question.  The Conference Report states that the requirement to identify “‘important’ factors” 
was not intended to “provide an opportunity for plaintiff counsel to conduct discovery on what 
factors were known to the issuer at the time the forward-looking statement was made” and the 
“use of the words ‘meaningful’ and ‘important factors’ are intended [to permit deciding a motion 
to dismiss] without examining the state of mind of the defendant.”186  Moreover, in a passage 
that the SEC did not address, the Conference Committee concluded its explanation of the safe 
harbor with a general statement that state of mind is irrelevant to the first prong.187   The SEC 
thus has conflated, on the one hand, what historical facts may have been misrepresented with, on 
the other, the defendant’s state of mind with regard to those facts.  There is no question that a 
cautionary statement with an historical (or current) component may, to that extent, be a material 
misstatement that may itself give rise to a claim, apart from the forward-looking character of 
other parts of the statement.188  It is a very fine distinction indeed, implicitly made by the SEC, to 
assert that state of mind is not relevant in determining whether some known cautionary statement 
                                                 
185 SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 181, at 11.   
186 PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743. 
187 See supra text accompanying note 56. 
188 See, e.g., supra note 116.  Of course, in order to prevail in a claim under Rule 10b-5 
the plaintiff must establish that the statement was made with scienter.  State of mind is relevant 
in any Rule 10b-5 claim. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10. 
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was omitted altogether but state of mind is relevant in determining whether some cautionary 
statement was false.  Either inquiry would collide with the Conference Committee’s concern 
about allowing discovery “on what factors were known to the issuer at the time the forward-
looking statement was made.”189  
An anomaly produced by the SEC’s position is that the plaintiff may not take discovery, 
including inquiring into the defendant’s state of mind, if the plaintiff alleges that some important 
cautionary factor was omitted altogether, but the plaintiff can take discovery if one of the 
cautionary factors relates to a present or historical state of affairs.  This distinction would tend to 
encourage issuers to limit their cautionary factors to prospective ones and exclude altogether any 
reference to current trends, thus arguably resulting in the disclosure of fewer cautionary factors – 
so long as the issuer believed that it had disclosed sufficient important ones to satisfy the test of 
“meaningful cautionary statements.”  If, on the other hand, a plaintiff can recast any cautionary 
statement into an implication about the past or the present and thereby circumvent the prohibition 
on inquiring into what the speaker knew when the forward-looking statement was made, very 
little may remain of the first prong of the safe harbor. 
The issue addressed in this article is whether state of mind is relevant to determine the 
sufficiency of the cautionary statements.  In its brief the SEC did not directly address whether the 
defendant’s state of mind with respect to the non-historical elements of the cautionary statements 
is in any way germane to application of the first prong of the safe harbor.190  
                                                 
189 PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 44, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 743. 
190 The SEC did not address this issue because the SEC directed its analysis to what it 
understood to be the limited question presented by the pending case, where the pivotal allegation 
was that the defendant cautioned about “potential deterioration in the high yield sector” when it 
was alleged that deterioration was actually occurring when the statement was made. SEC Amicus 
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The SEC also addressed the nature of “actual knowledge” necessary to satisfy the second 
prong of the safe harbor:191 
A statement of prediction or expectation . . . contains at least three implicit factual 
assertions, including (i) that the statement is genuinely believed; (ii) that there is a 
reasonable basis for that belief; and (iii) that the speaker is not aware of any 
undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement.  . . 
.  It follows, then, that a speaker has “actual knowledge” that a forward-looking 
statement is misleading if the speaker actually knows that one or more of these 
implicit factual representations is not true. 
That is, the defendant must be “subjectively aware that one of the implicit factual assertions 
underlying its forward-looking statement was false when the statement was made.”192  The SEC 
did not argue that this actual knowledge test, e.g., whether the forward-looking statement is 
“genuinely believed” or “that the speaker is . . . aware of . . . undisclosed facts tending to 
seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement,” has any application to the “meaningful 
cautionary statement” prong of the safe harbor, nor did the SEC state that an allegation of the 
second prong precludes reliance on the first prong – issues that were not posed to it by the court 
of appeals.  
VI. THE FIRST PRONG OF THE SAFE HARBOR FOR FORWARD-LOOKING 
STATEMENTS PROVIDES A COMPLETE DEFENSE THAT CANNOT BE 
OVERRIDDEN BY ALLEGATIONS OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
FALSITY OF A PROJECTION 
Many courts and commentators perceive the plain meaning of the statutory safe harbor 
for forward-looking statements to be that each of the two principal prongs of the safe harbor 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brief, supra note 181, at 9.  See also 2008 WL 4501928, at *2 (summarizing allegations of the 
complaint). 
191 SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 181, at 11-12.  Whether this is an accurate statement of 
the actual knowledge criterion is beyond the scope of this article. 
192 Id. at 13. 
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operates independently, so that satisfaction of the first prong (inclusion of meaningful cautionary 
statements) renders plaintiff’s reliance on the second prong (defendant’s actual knowledge that 
the statement was false) irrelevant.193  This interpretation is grounded in the disjunctive “or” that 
separates subclauses (A) and (B) of Section 21E(c)(1).194  The legislative history, most notably 
the primary source,195 the Conference Report, also supports this interpretation of the statutory 
language by making an unqualified statement that the defendant’s state of mind is altogether 
irrelevant to the first prong.196  The major arguable weakness in this analysis is the disclaimer by 
Congressional proponents of the safe harbor that it was not a license to lie – in answer to the 
opponents who expressed the fear that that is exactly what the safe harbor, in its final form, 
would allow.197  The statutory language, especially as reinforced by the Conference Report, 
controls over statements by individual legislators under the conventional approach to relying on 
legislative history as a tool for statutory interpretation.198 
There are two other strains of judicial decisions and commentary – one that seems to 
ignore the disjunctive language of the statute altogether, without comment,199 and another that, 
on several different approaches, precludes finding cautions to be meaningful when the speaker 
                                                 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 115-118 (cases) and 144-148 (commentators). 
194 The word “or” also separates subclauses (i) (“meaningful cautionary statements”) and 
(ii) (“immaterial”) of subclause (A). See, e.g., Goodman Life,  2010 WL 154519, at *10 (“The 
statute offers several ways for a defendant to avoid liability, all written in the disjunctive.”). 
195 See supra text accompanying note 48. 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 53-56. 
197 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 86 and 88. 
198 See supra text accompanying note 50. 
199 See supra text accompanying notes 119-120. 
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knows but does not disclose that the projection is false.200  If non-disclosure of actual knowledge 
that the projection is false precludes reliance on the first prong, then there is no real difference 
between the two prongs – a result that courts abhor.201   
Several commentators have mounted a vigorous assault on the plain meaning approach to 
interpreting the safe harbor.  Beck’s proposed interpretation – which he acknowledges would 
largely obliterate the distinction between these two prongs202 – is flawed to the extent that it 
purports to be an interpretation of the statute as adopted as distinguished from what  (he urges) 
Congress should have done.  Beck recognizes that Congress relied on the Trump approach to 
bespeaks caution but he argues that it erred in so doing because Trump departed from the earlier 
bespeaks caution cases.203  The evidence that Congress accepted the Trump materiality-focused 
version of the doctrine, however, is very strong.204  Beck also misperceives the independence of 
the separate “immaterial” element of the safe harbor.205   
                                                 
200 See supra text accompanying notes 121-141 (cases) and 149-178 (commentators). 
201 SINGER ET AL.,  supra note 48, § 46.6, at 230-44 (“A statute should be construed so 
that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of 
obvious mistake or error.”) (footnote omitted). 
202 See supra text accompanying note 178. 
203 See supra text accompanying notes 160-164. 
204 See supra text accompanying note 106 (demonstrating that the safe harbor uses the 
formulation “meaningful cautionary statements” from Trump); supra note 163; O’Hare, supra 
note 105, 58 U. PITT. L. REV.  at 641; Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 195-96. 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 171-172. 
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Professor Coffee’s objections are unpersuasive.  After the statute was enacted he urged an 
interpretation different from the plain meaning,206 notwithstanding that when the statute was 
under consideration he opposed it because of the import of its plain meaning,207 and had himself 
urged a cautionary statement safe harbor from which he deliberately omitted any state of mind 
test.208  He may change his mind about what Congress should have done, but the issue under 
consideration here is what Congress in fact did.  In addition, his more recent analysis relies on an 
assessment that the pre-PSLRA bespeaks caution doctrine did not apply where the speaker knew 
the projection was false, which overstates the uniformity of the law on that point – especially 
insofar as the Trump ruling is concerned.209 
The language of the statute should be applied as the disjunctive phrases read, with 
“meaningful” interpreted without reference to the speaker’s knowledge (much less belief) in the 
truth or falsity of the projection.  The defendant “shall not be liable” either if the defendant 
satisfies the first prong “or” the plaintiff is unable to prove (and first plead) that the defendant 
acted with actual knowledge that the projection was false.  This gives each prong independent 
significance: the first principal prong applies if there are meaningful cautionary statements, 
irrespective of the state of mind of the speaker; the “immaterial” prong applies if for some other 
reason (most likely puffery) the forward-looking statement is not material; and the “actual 
knowledge” prong is available if there were not meaningful cautionary statements and the 
statement was not otherwise immaterial.   
                                                 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 149-152. 
207 See supra notes 100 and 149. 
208 See supra note 149. 
209 See supra text accompanying note 152. 
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Beck acknowledges this harmonious construction of the alternatives, but objects to it 
because it “invites managers to intentionally deceive investors.”210  This objection, like the 
concerns expressed by some members of Congress that the safe harbor would be a “license to 
lie,”211 raises a policy issue about the wisdom of adopting the provision. This, of course, is for 
Congress, not the courts, to resolve.212   In the absence of any demonstration that prior to the 
PSLRA the availability of the bespeaks caution doctrine provided any increased inducement for 
managers of public companies to engage in deception, or even that the SEC’s relaxation of the 
prohibition on projections in documents filed with the SEC213 led to deliberate deception, there is 
no basis to believe that Congress intentionally tilted the balance in a way that was expected to 
increase deceptive conduct.   Indeed, Congress arguably allowed more opportunity for deception 
by requiring proof of “actual knowledge” in order to sustain a claim where an inadequately 
qualified material forward-looking statement was unfulfilled, thereby imposing a standard of 
                                                 
210 Beck, supra note 105, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. at 199 n.129.   Beck also correctly notes that 
if the first prong does nothing more than identify a form of immateriality, it would have been 
enough for Congress to have adopted two prongs – an immateriality prong and an actual 
knowledge prong. Id. at 200 n.131.  Any arguable overlap would be eliminated by adding the 
word “otherwise” before “immaterial” in Section 21E(c)(1)(A)(ii), and Professor Coffee – an 
advocate of a narrow interpretation of the first prong (see supra text accompanying notes 149-
152) – reads the statute as if the word “otherwise” were there, its omission being no more than “a 
simplifying language change.” See supra note 35. 
 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 83-84, 90, 96-97, and 101. 
212  See, e.g., Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.. 128 S. Ct. 2326, 
2339 (2008) (stating, in response to contention that challenged application of a statute would 
reflect an “absurd” policy, that it is not for a court to substitute its view of policy for legislation 
which has been passed by Congress). 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. 
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greater culpability than is otherwise necessary to sustain a claim under Rule 10b-5.214  The task 
here is not to second guess what Congress decided, but to ascertain what in fact the adopted 
statutory language means.  Because it was the manifest intent of Congress to enhance the 
protection for public companies that made forward-looking statements,215 it would be 
inconsistent with Congressional intent to interpret the statutory safe harbor so that it would be 
narrower than the bespeaks caution doctrine.216  
The thrust of the argument of the SEC in its recent amicus brief, addressing the specific 
facts alleged in the case on which it was asked by the court to express its views, is that a false 
historical statement that is implied by the cautionary statements is not protected by the safe 
                                                 
214 There is no doubt that “actual knowledge” is something more than the minimum 
scienter required to sustain a claim under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Institutional Investors Group v. 
Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 274 (3d Cir. 2009) (“the scienter requirement for forward-looking 
statements is stricter than that for statements of current fact. Whereas liability for the latter 
requires a showing of either knowing falsity or recklessness, liability for the former attaches only 
upon proof of knowing falsity”); Gilat, 2005 WL 2277476, at *12 (noting that the second prong 
“imposes a heightened scienter requirement for forward-looking statements not accompanied by 
cautionary language”).  For example, it is generally held that reckless conduct satisfies the 
scienter requirement under Rule 10b-5. See supra text accompanying note 10.  For the SEC’s 
interpretation of this term, see supra text accompanying note 191 (asserting that the speaker must 
“actually know[]” that at least one of certain representations implicit in the forward-looking 
statement “is not true”).  See also SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 181, at 12 (footnote omitted): 
[T]his standard is distinct from, and requires more than, a showing that a speaker 
acted recklessly in making a misleading forward-looking statement. Although the 
PSLRA’s legislative history is unilluminating on the matter, the plain language of 
the provision requiring “actual knowledge” indicates that, to avoid the safe 
harbor, a plaintiff needs to show more than that a defendant acted recklessly. 
215 See supra note 21 and text accompanying notes 58-61. 
216 The Conference Report stated that the statutory safe harbor was not intended to 
replace the bespeaks caution doctrine. PSLRA Conf. Rep., supra note 21, at 46, 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N.  at 745.  It would be odd to attribute to Congress an intention to adopt a statutory 
safe harbor that was narrower than the prevailing application of the bespeaks caution doctrine.  
To do only that would have been to do no more than protect defendants if courts abandoned or 
narrowed the bespeaks caution doctrine. 
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harbor.217  The SEC’s analysis does not present a cogent basis for taking into account, under the 
first prong of the safe harbor, the defendant’s state of mind – actual knowledge or otherwise – 
with regard to whether it believes the prediction will come true. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
What seems to underlie the judicial and scholarly reluctance to give the first prong 
independent significance as urged in this article is an antipathy to exonerate a person who spoke 
falsely knowing that his words were false.218  This ignores the underlying thrust of the first prong 
– that which is meaningfully qualified is simply not material, as under the Trump formulation of 
the bespeaks caution doctrine.  A necessary element of a claim of deception under the securities 
laws is that the statement that is the subject of the cause of action is material.219  If the statement 
is not material it thus does not matter whether it was uttered with a vile intent to deceive, with 
actual knowledge of the falsity, recklessly or entirely innocently.  “The anti-fraud provisions of 
the securities laws are plainly disinterested with immaterial statements, no matter the state of 
mind of the speaker.”220 
The first prong of the statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements should be 
dispositive where it is satisfied, without requiring that any doubt or lack of belief about the 
projection be disclosed in order for the cautionary statements to be “meaningful” as that term is 
                                                 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 181-190. 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 116-117 (citing cases in which the court 
reluctantly found the first prong applied even where actual knowledge was alleged). 
219 See supra note 9 and text accompanying note 12. 
220 Goodman Life, 2010 WL 154519, at *11. 
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used in the first prong.  The defendant’s state of mind with regard to unmatured contingencies or 
the likelihood of the projection being realized is not a factor in applying the first prong. 
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